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1112019] COMMENT
INTRODUCTION
Hayward Jones is not the person he was at 23 years old.1 Jones
describes his 23-year-old self as angry, reckless, and without direction.2 
After losing his sister, Jones suffered from severe depression and
substance abuse.3 He lacked vision and purpose and ultimately made a 
decision that cost him life in prison.4 After two years behind bars, Jones
decided to redefine his life:5 “I had to rationalize; if I never make it out of
prison, what kind of legacy will I leave?”6 Today, at 45 years old, Jones is 
fulfilling his goal of helping others as a full-time mentor to prisoners
serving non-life sentences.7 Given his own life experiences, Jones can
relate to his mentees’ pain and hardship, and he can help them understand
that they can still choose a different life—they do not have to succumb to
a cycle of crime, incarceration, and complacency.8 Jones’s mentorship,
and that of other “lifers” 9 at Angola, has proven so effective that a different
Louisiana prison, Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, recently asked Jones to
pilot its new moral rehabilitation program.10 
Louisiana law currently denies lifers like Jones the possibility of
parole, implying that lifers are incapable of rehabilitation.11 Jones and
other lifers, however, lead state-funded moral rehabilitation programs
across Louisiana.12 The state’s contradictory sentiment toward lifers
frustrates both inmates and wardens alike.13 Warden Perry Stagg, Deputy
Warden at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, has spent years working with
Jones and other lifer mentors, and he has witnessed the lifers’ dedication
1. Interview with Hayward Jones, Elayn Hunt Corr. Ctr., in Baton Rouge,








9. The term “lifers,” as used in this Comment, refers to individuals serving
life sentences.
10. Id.
11. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(A)(2) (2018).
12. See Reentry Programming, LA. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY & CORRECTIONS, 
https://doc.louisiana.gov/reentry-programming [https://perma.cc/7MMM-DT7V]
(last visited Oct. 13, 2018); Interview with Jones, supra note 1.
13. Interview with Perry Stagg, Deputy Warden, at Elayn Hunt Corr. Ctr., in
Baton Rouge, La. (Jan. 18, 2018).
337366-LSU_80-1_Text.indd  118 11/27/19  9:28 AM




     
  
  
   
  




    
     
  
   
  
 
    
  
    
  
  
    
   
  
   
 
   
    
    
    
    
   
     
   
 
 
        
    
   
    
 
 
   
   
112 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
to their mentees.14 Warden Stagg stressed, “I am a staunch Republican
conservative, as are most people that I work with here, and I believe that
99% of us would agree that life without the possibility of parole . . . does 
not make sense in most cases.”15 Warden Stagg went on to explain that
“these are not bad people, but people who did a bad thing, and at some
point in their lives they deserve to tell their story . . . they deserve hope.”16 
If the reality of a life-without-parole sentence is vexing for the correctional
officers, it is heartbreaking for the lifers. 
For lifers like Jones, the Louisiana Legislature’s actions are
exceptionally frustrating. Jones knows the wisdom, experience, and
positivity he could bring to his community if released. 17 He also knows
that the legislature has no justifiable argument in support of his continued
incarceration.18 Regardless of whatever actions the legislature does or does
not take, Jones plans to live each day with integrity, “. . . not because 
people are watching me, but because integrity is what you do when no one
is watching.”19 Advocates of criminal justice reform, however, think it is
time that the Louisiana Legislature took notice.20 
Over the last 10 years, citizens and politicians across the country have
rallied in support of criminal justice reform.21 In concert with this 
movement, the Louisiana Legislature finally took steps in 2017 to rid
Louisiana of its title as the nation’s greatest incarcerator, adopting the most
comprehensive criminal justice reform in the state’s history.22 Louisiana’s
reforms, however, largely excluded changes to sentences associated with




17. Interview with Jones, supra note 1.
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See generally Andrew Callaghan, Prisoners Look to Life After
Incarceration Through Reentry Program, MAROON (Nov. 10, 2017), https://
loyolamaroon.com/10015548/showcase/prisoners-look-to-life-after-incarceration-
through-reentry-program/ [https://perma.cc/8G95-B9EM].
21. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 14–15 (2017).
22. Louisiana’s 2017 Criminal Justice Reforms: The Most Incarcerated State
Changes Course, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts
.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/03/louisianas-2017-criminal-justice-
reforms [https://perma.cc/YW5Y-WBSA]. In June 2017, Governor John Bel Edwards
signed 10 bills, referred to as the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI), into law. See
discussion infra Sections I.B–C.
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attempts to “decarcerate” Louisiana.23 To reform the practices that fueled 
the state’s mass incarceration, the legislature first needs to reform its use
of long sentences.24 
Louisiana’s practice of locking up offenders and “throwing away the
key” is costly, inefficient, and unjust.25 Louisiana sentences more people
to life than any other state in the country and twice as many as the national
average.26 Thirty percent of Louisiana’s prisoners are serving life or
“virtual life” sentences.27 Approximately half of all prisoners who have
served over 10 years in Louisiana state prisons were under the age of 25
at the time of their offenses, and now, nearly two-thirds are 45 years old 
or older.28 The Louisiana Legislature’s refusal to grant parole eligibility to 
its many, older lifers is not a research-supported practice.29 Studies
consistently demonstrate that the inclination to engage in criminal activity
23. See Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana Considers Giving More Old Prisoners
a Chance at Parole, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.nola.com
/politics/index.ssf/2018/04/louisiana_geriatric_parole.html [https://perma.cc/R4
CA-ZDAG]; LA. JUST. REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE, LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY
& CORRECTIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23 (2017) [hereinafter TASK 
FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS]. “Decarceration” is a colloquial term
that criminal justice advocates frequently utilize to refer to the reduction of prison
populations. See generally Dennis Schrantz et al., Decarceration Strategies: How
5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions, SENT’G PROJECT
(Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/decarceration-
strategies-5-states-achieved-substantial-prison-population-reductions/ [https://per
ma.cc/7ALY-BB4V].
24. See generally Ashley Nellis, Next Step for Louisiana Prison Reform Is to
Review Life Sentences, SENT’G PROJECT 1 (July 7, 2017), https://www.sentencing
project.org/news/next-step-louisiana-prison-reform-review-life-sentences/ [https:
//perma.cc/Q3HM-HBRX].
25. See generallyMarc Mauer, A Proposal to Reduce Time Served in Federal
Prison, SENT’G PROJECT 1, 2 (2015), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publicat
ions/a-proposal-to-reduce-time-served-in-federal-prison [https://perma.cc/F37K-
XDHQ]; Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Minimizing the Maximum: The Case for
Shortening all Prison Sentences, in SMART DECARCERATION: ACHIEVING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSFORMATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 145–150 (C. Pettus-
Davis & M. Epperson eds., 2017). 
26. Nellis, supra note 24, at 5.
27. Id. “Virtual life” sentences are numerical sentences that are the practical
equivalent of life in prison, generally defined as sentences of 50 years or more. Id.
28. Id.
29. SeeMauer, supra note 25; Edward Shihadeh et al., Recidivism in the State
of Louisiana: An Analysis of 3- and 5-Year Recidivism Rates Among Long-Serving
Offenders 4 (LSU Dep’t of Sociology, Crime & Policy Evaluation Research Grp.
working paper, August, 2013). 
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114 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
peaks in adolescence and declines into adulthood.30 As most lifers in 
Louisiana have therefore surpassed the peak of criminality and have “aged 
out of crime,” the high cost associated with incarcerating older offenders
constitutes an inefficient utilization of limited state resources.31 
Further, the Louisiana Legislature’s continued use of the mandatory
life-without-parole sentence only perpetuates the unjust sentencing
practices that led to the state’s rise in mass incarceration.32 Louisiana rose  
to a state of mass incarceration predominantly because of an increase in
excessive sentencing—or the administration of sentences that incarcerate
individuals longer than necessary to achieve the desired penological
goals.33 Mandatory life without parole is itself an excessive sentence
because it prolongs the incarceration of rehabilitated offenders, fails to
deter future criminals, and exaggerates the punitive component of the
sentence.34 Additionally, although the Louisiana Legislature has taken
positive steps to end past injustices within its criminal justice system,
many individuals continue to suffer the consequences of the state’s prior
sentencing practices.35 In failing to provide parole eligibility to the
30. See Maureen G. Mones & Virginia G. Clegg, Age, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Jay S. Albanese et al. eds., 1st ed., Wiley
2014), https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/wileycacj/age/0?institution
Id=463 [https://perma.cc/C6R4-YE66]; Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 145–150. 
31. See generally Shihadeh et al., supra note 29, at 11; Rachael Bedard et al., 
Ageing Prisoners: An Introduction to Geriatric Health-care Challenges in
Correctional Facilities, 98 INT’L. REV. RED CROSS 917 (2016); Ghandnoosh,
supra note 25, at 148–50.
32. See generally Nellis, supra note 24; TASK FORCE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 57; Cindy Chang, Louisiana Incarcerated,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (2012), https://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/page/louisiana
_prison_capital.html [https://perma.cc/38WJ-3JVW].
33. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 326 (Jeremy Travis et
al. eds., National Academies Press 2014); see Chang, supra note 32. “Penology” is
a subdivision of criminology that studies the philosophical underpinnings and
practical implications of punishment within the context of the criminal justice
system. Penology, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.brit
annica.com/topic/penology [https://perma.cc/WY2V-YDMG].
34. See discussion infra Section III.B; see generally NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 33.
35. See Courtney Harper Turkington, Louisiana’s Addiction to Mass
Incarceration by the Numbers, 63 LOY. L. REV. 557 (2017); Dan Swenson,
Understanding Louisiana’s Nonunanimous Jury Law Findings, ADVOCATE (Apr.
1, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/courts/
article_159e7f5a-3459-11e8-b935-e7a91fc85713.html [https://perma.cc/YEN5-
ALX8].
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1152019] COMMENT
individuals sentenced under the now-abandoned practices—such as the
non-unanimous jury law and the state’s old habitual offender law—the 
Louisiana Legislature is only furthering their effects.36 In order to truly
break ties with Louisiana’s practices of unjustified sentencing and mass 
incarceration, Louisiana must expand its existing geriatric parole statute,
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15.574.4(A)(2), to include parole eligibility
for individuals serving life sentences.37 
Part I of this Comment discusses the national movement to decrease
incarceration rates and the importance of lessening sanctions for violent
crime. Part I also explains the Louisiana Legislature’s decision to pursue
criminal justice reform and demonstrates how the narrowed focus on
nonviolent offenders decreases the effectiveness of Louisiana’s current
reform efforts. Part II explains how Louisiana became a national outlier
through abuse of life-without-parole sentences and how Louisiana’s
current parole eligibility statute contributes to the problem of mass
incarceration. Part III introduces a proposed amendment to Louisiana’s
existing geriatric parole statute and explains why adopting the amendment
is in the best interest of Louisiana. Section III.A demonstrates how
continuing to deny parole eligibility to lifers yields a high social and fiscal
cost for Louisiana. Section III.B illustrates how life without parole fails to
satisfy the penological justifications of a prisoner’s sentence— 
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation. Section III.C
introduces the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding
juvenile life without parole and Louisiana’s recent vote to abolish non-
unanimous jury verdicts, both of which have a strong bearing on the
Louisiana Legislature’s decision to expand parole eligibility to lifers. The
Conclusion to this Comment reiterates why the legislature should adopt
the proposed amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15.574.4(A)(2). 
I. RETHINKING VIOLENT CRIME TO ACHIEVE TRUE REFORM
Across the country, state efforts to address mass incarceration largely 
involve mitigating penalties for nonviolent crime while leaving harsh
36. See generally id; TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 23, at 57. Under Louisiana’s habitual offender statute, individuals sentenced
to a second or third felony conviction, or a fourth or subsequent nonviolent
offense, were sentenced to life without parole. Turkington, supra note 35. Prior
to 2018, Louisiana was the only state that allowed murder convictions with two
dissenting jurors. Swenson, supra note 35.
37. See generally Nellis, supra note 24; TASK FORCE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 57.
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116 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
punishments for violent crime unchanged.38 Where states’ reform efforts
purport to tackle longer sentences, they often exclude violent offenders,
which vastly weakens the states’ abilities to decrease incarceration rates.39 
For example, Oklahoma legislators introduced “The Parole of Aging
Prisoners Act” in 2017 to reduce prison populations by expanding parole
eligibility to inmates over 50 who had served 10 years or one-third of their
sentences.40 Because the bill excluded individuals convicted of 22
different violent crimes, however, only one-quarter of Oklahoma prisoners
50 years or older would ultimately be eligible under the new law.41 
Measures to exclude violent offenders from criminal justice reform
legislation, like those taken in Oklahoma, are common because
policymakers fear losing a “tough on crime” image.42 If state legislators
are serious about bringing impactful criminal justice reform and tangible
public safety benefits to their communities, sentences for violent crimes
should be the focus of reform legislation rather than the exception.43 
Sentencing policies in the United States operate on the theory of
proportionality, or the idea that a more severe crime deserves a more
severe punishment.44 Extreme punishments increase sentences for all 
offense levels because they serve as the “anchor point” against which to 
scale lesser penalties.45 The administration of how and to whom states
award the most severe penalties, such as life without parole, has lasting 
consequences for the criminal justice system as a whole.46 As violent
criminal offenders generally serve the longest sentences, legislative
reforms that exclude violent offenders substantially impair the ability to
affect incarceration rates.47 
38. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 5–6.
39. Ashley Nellis, Still Life: America’s Increasing Use of Life and Long-
Term Sentences, SENT’G PROJECT 6 (2017), https://www.sentencingproject
.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Still-Life.pdf [https://perma.cc/NXG6-7H6B].
40. Aging Prisoners Parole, OKLA. PARDON & PAROLE BD., https://www.ok
.gov/ppb/Paroles_and_Revocations/Aging_Prisioners_Parole/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7UP9-AJ9K] (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
41. Id. By the time the Oklahoma Legislature passed the bill in 2018, it had 
raised the parole eligibility age to 60 and categorically excluded all violent crimes, 
further mitigating the legislation’s impact on prison populations. Id. 
42. Nellis, supra note 39.
43. Id. 
44. Mauer, supra note 25, at 2.
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 138. 
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1172019] COMMENT
Louisiana has the highest percentage of individuals serving life or
virtual life sentences in the country.48 Recalculating Louisiana’s overuse
of the harshest penalties is therefore imperative if the state seeks to achieve
true reform.49 Unfortunately, like many states across the country,
Louisiana continues to leave its harshest penalties untouched by reform
legislation.50 In order to make mass incarceration a thing of the past, both
nationally and in Louisiana, long sentences need to be the focal point of
reform legislation rather than the exception.51 
A. Efforts to Address Mass Incarceration in the United States Have 
Ignored Deeper Reforms
The United States’ history of mass incarceration has long stained its 
banner as “the land of the free.”52 Even though the United States only
contains 5% of the world’s population, the United States imprisons 25%
of the world’s prisoners.53 The rise in American incarceration first began
in the 1970s as a response to a national increase in violent crime.54 The 
national increase in crime gave rise to tough-on-crime policies that
supported enhanced criminal penalties and limited release options.55 
Although crime levels finally tapered throughout the 1990s, increasingly
punitive polices remained popular, and incarceration rates continued to
climb.56 By 2008, the number of incarcerated Americans was seven times
higher than that in 1972, ultimately peaking at 2.3 million people.57 
Criminal justice reform did not truly gain popularity until the fiscal
crisis of 2008.58 With crime rates at a 40-year low and a recession
tightening state budgets, state governments finally felt compelled to
48. Nellis, supra note 24. 
49. See TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 57.
50. See generally id.
51. See Mauer, supra note 25. A “long sentence” for purposes of this
Comment is a sentence of 10 years or more. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 57.
52. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 1.
53. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 2.
54. Id. The peak of the nation’s crime wave hit in 1991, with the violent crime
rate at 400% of its 1960 level. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 3.
55. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 138; TASK FORCE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 14.
56. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 27.
57. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 14 
(2017).
58. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 4.
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118 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
pursue criminal justice reform.59 In 2007, Texas became the first of many 
states to initiate reform through “justice reinvestment” policy60—an 
approach to criminal justice reform that utilizes locality-specific responses
to high incarceration rates in a manner that promotes the most efficient
allocation of state resources.61 As of 2015, state implementation of justice
reinvestment policies had altered the country’s incarceration landscape: 44
states had reduced crime rates; 35 states had reduced imprisonment rates;
and 31 states had done both.62 
B. Justice Reinvestment Policies Take a Modest Approach to Criminal
Justice Reform 
Despite the optimistic trajectory and growing bipartisan support for
criminal justice reform, drastic changes to America’s incarceration rate 
remain unlikely.63 As politicians fear political backlash for appearing “soft
on crime,” justice reinvestment legislation generally omits reforms to
sentences for violent crime, even though violent offenders account for
almost two-thirds of national prison growth since 1990.64 
Today, individuals serving time for violent crime make up over half
of all state prisoners and represent most of the state prisoners serving long
sentences.65 In fact, violent offenders have such a profound impact on the
country’s criminal justice system that, even if American prisons were to
release “half of all people convicted of property and public-order crimes,
100% of those in for drug possession, and 75% of those in for drug 
trafficking, our prison population would [only] drop from 1.3 million to
59. Id.
60. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 2.
Today, over two-thirds of the states across the country have adopted a justice 
reinvestment policy. Id.
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id.
63. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 5–6. In Locked In, John F. Pfaff blames what he
calls “The Standard Story” for mitigating the impact of current criminal reform
efforts. Pfaff finds that The Standard Story, or the narrative that surrounds and
fuels reform efforts, focuses on shocking stories, such as the War on Drugs and
prison privatization, but gives too little attention to the less-shocking but more 
influential causes of prison growth. Shocking stories attract attention to the 
number of nonviolent offenders in prison but leave little attention for prisoners
serving long sentences for violent crime. Id.
64. Id. at 5, 11.
65. Id. 
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1192019] COMMENT
950,000.”66 A 35,000 prisoner decrease might seem significant, but it
would only bring incarceration rates back to where they were in 1994— 
still three times greater than when the spike in incarceration began.67 
Focusing reform on sentences for nonviolent crime alone, therefore, 
results in only modest decreases to overall incarceration rates.68 Pervasive
policies that focus on mitigating sentences for violent offenders are
necessary if states seek true reform.69 
As long sentences play a principal role in creating a state of mass 
incarceration, one would expect sentences for violent crime to comprise a 
critical portion of reform legislation.70 Although justice reinvestment
proposals frequently cite the negligible public benefit and high cost of
sentences exceeding 20 years,71 proposals to lessen sentences for violent
crimes rarely become legislation because legislators fear garnering
political unpopularity among constituents and becoming easy targets for
political opponents.72 Nevertheless, meaningful reductions in the U.S.
prison population will remain elusive unless states “rethink how they
punish people convicted of violent crimes, where ‘rethink’ means ‘think
about how to punish less.’”73 Current approaches to punishing violent
crime ignore the significant quantity of research demonstrating that
offenders age out of crime and that violent offenders are the least likely to
re-offend if released.74 Incorporating research about violent behavior into 
states’ sentencing structures is critical if states are to achieve true reform— 
and no state is in greater need of true reform than Louisiana.75 
66. Id. at 185. Examples of public order offenses include loitering and
disturbing the peace. Dale E. Bennett, Public Law: Criminal Law, 34 LA. L. REV. 
332, 332 (1974). Examples of common property offenses include auto theft,
burglary, and fraud. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the
Era of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 341 at
n. 19 (2009).
67. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 185.
68. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 138–41. Using 2012’s annual
decarceration rate of 1.8%, the highest rate as of 2013, it would take until 2101 to
decrease the prison population to where it was in 1980. Id. at 139.
69. See generally id.
70. Nellis, supra note 39, at 18.
71. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, 
at 23; PFAFF, supra note 21, at 185.
72. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 185–87.
73. Id. at 185.
74. Id. at 186–87.
75. Id.
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120 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
C. Louisiana’s Criminal Justice Reform Has Fallen Prey to “The 
Standard Story”
Until 2018, Louisiana spent 15 years as the prison capital of the world, 
incarcerating a higher percentage of its people than any other state or
country.76 By 2012, Louisiana’s prison population reached all-time highs, 
with approximately 40,000 people behind bars.77 Even after a 9% decrease
from 2012 to 2015, the Louisiana prison population in 2017 was five times
higher than it was in the late 1970s, and it was growing 30 times faster
than the state’s resident population.78 Mass incarceration was also taking
its toll on the Louisiana budget.79 In 2016, Louisiana spent $700 million 
on corrections but also witnessed its 28th straight year with the highest
murder rate in the country, highlighting the insignificant effect that high
incarceration rates were having on crime.80 Louisiana continued on its
mass incarceration trajectory until 2017, when the legislature finally made
the commitment to mend Louisiana’s broken criminal justice system.81 
76. Cindy Chang, Louisiana is the World’s Prison Capital, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(May 13, 2012, 3:00 P.M.), https://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/05/
louisiana_is_the_worlds_prison.html [https://perma.cc/YFQ5-FW4R]. As the 
highest incarcerator in America until 2018, Louisiana was also the highest
incarcerator in the world—locking up its citizens at a rate 5 times higher than Iran
and 13 times higher than China. Id. 
77. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 2. With
approximately 40,000 behind bars, 1 of every 86 adults in Louisiana was serving
time. Chang, supra note 76. 
78. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 2.
National data on imprisonment for 2014 revealed that Louisiana’s imprisonment
rate was 816 people incarcerated for every 100,000 residents—a rate double the 
national average and significantly higher than the second and third highest
incarcerating states. Id.
79. See generally id.; LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRECTIONS,
LOUISIANA’S JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REFORMS FIRST ANNUAL PERFORMANCE
REPORT 5 (2018), http://gov.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/JRI/LA_JRI_Annual_Re
port_FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/P45U-8KYE] [hereinafter JRI PERFORMANCE
REPORT].
80. JRI PERFORMANCEREPORT, supra note 79, at 5; Emily Lane, Louisiana’s
Murder Rate Again Leads the U.S.: See how Other States Compare, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (Sept. 28, 2017, 11:37 PM), https://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf
/2017/09/louisiana_murder_rate_fbi_crim.html [https://perma.cc/ZEK3-JMCK].
81. See generally Hamida Labi, Louisiana Locks up More of its Citizens Than
any Other State in the Nation, but Reform Is Coming, ACLU (June 23, 2017, 3:30
PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/louisiana-locks-more-its-citizens-
any-other-state-nation-reform-coming?redirect=blog/speak-freely/louisiana-lock
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1212019] COMMENT
1. Louisiana’s First Steps Toward “Decarceration” 
On June 15, 2017, Governor John Bel Edwards made history when he
signed 10 bills, known as “The Justice Reinvestment” legislation (“JRI”),
into law, marking the beginning of Louisiana’s decarceration trajectory.82 
With the Louisiana Legislature’s recognition of the high costs and low
utility of mass incarceration, the JRI legislation received bipartisan
support and became the most comprehensive criminal justice reform in 
state history.83 Over the course of 10 years, the legislature projects that the
package will reduce incarceration by 10% and save Louisiana $262
million.84 The JRI legislation requires the state to reinvest 70% of all
money saved through the reforms into local public safety initiatives.85 
The JRI legislation is largely a product of the Justice Reinvestment
Task Force’s (“Task Force”) collaborative research.86 In 2015, the
Louisiana Legislature created the Task Force with the specific directive to
identify and analyze the vehicles driving prison growth in Louisiana and
to create a strategy for comprehensive reforms.87 The Task Force spent
over a year meeting with experts and holding public forums to determine




83. Louisiana’s 2017 Criminal Justice Reforms, supra note 22. 
84. Id. 
85. LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRECTIONS, LOUISIANA’S JUSTICE
REINVESTMENT REFORMS: PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 38 (Aug. 1, 2017) [hereinafter
JRI PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE]. Act 489 of the JRI legislation requires that 70% of
the surplus budget from the reforms be reinvested into: (1) parishes, judicial
districts, and nonprofits to expand evidence-backed prison alternatives;
(2) victims’ services, treatment, transitional housing, and victim-focused training
for justice system professionals; (3) community supervision, recidivism reduction
programming, and in-prison programming; and (4) juvenile justice initiatives and
programs. Id.; see H.B. 489, 2017 Reg. Sess. (La. 2017).
86. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 2. The
Louisiana Legislature created the Task Force in 2015 through House Concurrent
Resolution 82. H.R. Con. 82, Reg. Sess. (La. 2015).
87. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 2. The
15-member Task Force was comprised of Senators, State Representatives, the 
Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, State District Judges,
representatives from the Department of Corrections and Public Defenders, and
representatives and leaders of various nonprofits and criminal justice
organizations. Id.
88. Id. at 7.
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122 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
to the Louisiana Legislature, the Task Force proposed a series of policy
recommendations that encompassed five priorities: (1) ensuring clarity and
consistency in sentencing; (2) prioritizing prison beds for those who pose a
serious threat to public safety; (3) strengthening community supervision;
(4) removing barriers to successful reentry; and (5) reinvesting a substantial
portion of the savings.89 The legislature incorporated most of the Task 
Force’s recommendations into the 10-bill JRI package enacted in 2017.90 
2. Louisiana’s 2017 Criminal Justice Reform Bills Left Gaps
By 2018, only one year after the enactment of the 2017 criminal justice
reform package, Louisiana’s incarceration rate fell below Oklahoma’s, 
giving Louisiana the second highest incarceration rates in the country.91 In
addition to shedding its first place title, Louisiana also saved $12.2 million,
of which $8.54 million was reinvested into communities and public safety
efforts.92 The recent successes of the program, however, merely represent
“200 steps . . . [i]n the journey of 1,000 miles.”93 Although the one-year
anniversary of the reforms marked a step in the right direction, significant
gaps in the legislation remain.94 
89. Id.
90. Grace Toohey, Louisiana Sees Large Drop in Prison Population a Year
After Historic Criminal Justice Reforms, ADVOCATE (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_a5c01e10 
-7ad9-11e8-856e-ebf326bf26bc.html [https://perma.cc/E6AD-BLTK]. 
91. Alanah Odoms Hebert, Louisiana Is no Longer the World’s Prison
Capital. Here’s What’s Next, ACLU (July 2, 2018), https://www.laaclu.org/en/
news/louisiana-no-longer-worlds-prison-capital-heres-whats-next [https://perma
.cc/7K65-HQ6S].
92. Grace Toohey, Louisiana Reserved $8.5M of Criminal Justice Reform
Savings and Here’s Where it Will Go, ADVOCATE (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.the
advocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/article_a5c8b012-d244-11e8-819b-5fb59
0ae1508.html [https://perma.cc/CE6G-7N9M]. As of July 2018, Louisiana’s total
prison population dropped by 7.6%, and the number of people imprisoned for
nonviolent crimes decreased by 20%. Id.
93. William Brangham & Frank Carlson, How ‘The Incarceration Capital of
America” Embraced Criminal Justice Reform, PBS NEWS HOUR (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-the-incarceration-capital-of-america-em
braced-criminal-justice-reform#transcript [https://perma.cc/4PQV-XBDU].
94. See generally Hebert, supra note 91.
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1232019] COMMENT
The JRI legislation has only had a negligible impact on the number of
individuals serving time for violent offenses.95 The JRI legislation
primarily focused on reserving prison beds for those who pose a serious
threat to public safety rather than nonviolent offenders.96 As Louisiana was 
sending nonviolent offenders to prison one and a half to three times more
than other southern states with similar crime rates, the Louisiana
Legislature took steps to address the over-incarceration of nonviolent
offenders.97 The JRI effort represents a laudable step in the right direction,
but the JRI legislation also creates the dangerous insinuation that
populations excluded from the 2017 reforms necessarily pose a serious
threat to public safety if released.98 A full reading of the Task Force’s
initial Report and Recommendations to the legislature clarifies that the
Task Force did not intend to adopt this conclusion.99 
The Louisiana Legislature excluded a number of the Task Force’s 
proposed reforms in the final JRI legislation.100 One of the unadopted
recommendations was Majority Recommendation 1, which provided some
of the longest-serving inmates in Louisiana—including those convicted 
for violent offenses—an opportunity for parole consideration.101 In the
Task Force’s report to the legislature, the Louisiana District Attorneys
Association (“LDAA”) posted a disclaimer stating that the LDAA is 
committed to working with the Task Force—but only to the extent that the
policy recommendations “do not go beyond nonviolent and non-serious
offenders.”102 Again, the fear of political vulnerability kept bipartisan
support for reform from reaching longer sentences.103 Admittedly, the
drafting and enactment of the JRI legislation signaled a progressive step
for Louisiana, which necessarily involved a delicate balance of numerous
and varied interests.104 To achieve true reform, however, legislators must
95. See JRI PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 79, at 6. The number of
individuals serving time for violent offenses is approximately the same as it was
before JRI. Id.
96. Id. at 14, 23.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id. at 14, 23.
99. See TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 56.
100. Hebert, supra note 91. 
101. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 56.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 5; PFAFF, supra note 21, at 185.
104. The drafters of the JRI legislation sought input from a diverse group of
Louisianans, including law enforcement, victims of violence, community
members, business leaders, district attorneys, and the previously incarcerated.
TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 2.
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124 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
defer less to appeasing all involved parties and instead place greater weight
upon the scientific data supporting parole eligibility for lifers.105 
II. “LIFE MEANS LIFE”: EXCESSIVE USE AND ABUSE OF LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE IN LOUISIANA 
Louisiana is one of the six remaining states where “life means life”— 
all life sentences foreclose the possibility of parole.106 Furthermore,
Louisiana broadly abuses the life sentence.107 Louisiana currently stands
as one of only two states where second-degree murder mandates a life-
without-parole sentence.108 Since the 1970s, Louisiana has steadily 
increased the use of life sentences and decreased the possibility of release
for prisoners serving life.109 In 2003, Louisiana had 3,822 lifers, or 10% of
prisoners, serving life without parole.110 By 2015, the number serving life 
without parole increased to 4,850, approximately 12% of all Louisiana 
prisoners.111 As the climb in individuals serving life sentences played a
critical role in Louisiana’s rise to mass incarceration, a change in the
state’s utilization of life sentences will be crucial to successful reform.112 
A. From 10 Years to Life: Understanding the Motivations for Longer
Sentences in Louisiana 
Although Louisiana has one of the highest percentages of prisoners
serving life without parole, that was not always the case.113 From the 1920s 
to the 1970s, a life sentence in Louisiana frequently meant only 10 years
in prison.114 Commentators refer to this pre-1970s practice as the “10/6
105. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 139–40.
106. MARIEKE LIEM, AFTER LIFE IMPRISONMENT: REENTRY IN THE ERA OF
MASS INCARCERATION 6 (2016). The other five states where life sentences do not 
carry the possibility of parole are Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Pennsylvania, and South
Dakota. Id. 
107. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 57.
108. Id. at 56. Mississippi is the only other state that mandates life without
parole for second-degree murder. Id. For comparison, in Texas, second-degree
murder is punishable by a 5- to 99-year sentence, with parole eligibility after 30
years. In Arkansas, second-degree murder carries a 10- to 40-year sentence. Id.
109. Marc Mauer et al., The Meaning of “Life”: Long Prison Sentences in
Context, SENT’G PROJECT 6 (May 2004).
110. Id. 
111. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 56.
112. Id.
113. Nellis, supra note 24.
114. Nellis, supra note 39. 
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1252019] COMMENT
law,” where prisoners who demonstrated good conduct in prison could be
released after serving 10 years and 6 months of their life sentences.115 For
Louisiana, the 1970s introduced a tough-on-crime political movement at
the same time that the state was restructuring its prisons to accommodate
larger populations.116 This restructuring enabled Louisiana to handle the
influx of prisoners without having to moderate sentences or release
prisoners to make space.117 Along with these structural changes, the
definition of “life” changed in Louisiana.118 By the 1990s, rather than the 
possibility of 10 years and 6 months, “life meant life” in Louisiana.119 
Today, absent a pardon by the governor, a life sentence likely means dying 
in prison.120 In order to truly understand why Louisiana has yet to adjust
its excessive use of life sentences, one must understand the politically
motivated decisions that propelled the increase in life sentences and the
actors that continue to benefit from its rise.121 
1. Bad Timing: Prison Expansion During the Tough-on-Crime Era 
Unlike Louisiana’s sentencing structure, which has become
progressively more severe, prison conditions in Louisiana have actually
witnessed a dramatic improvement.122 Louisiana gained national attention
for its notorious prison conditions in 1971 after four inmates at the
Louisiana State Penitentiary—commonly referred to as “Angola” and
previously referred to as the “bloodiest prison in the nation”—brought suit
against the state for unconstitutional conditions.123 Upon review, United
StatesMagistrate Judge Frank Polozola of the Middle District of Louisiana
agreed with the inmate plaintiffs, finding that the conditions at Angola
115. Kate Hatheway, Creating a Meaningful Opportunity for Review:
Challenging the Politicization of Parole for Life Sentenced Prisoners, 54 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 601 (2017).
116. See Lydia Pelot-Hobbs, Louisiana’s Turn to Mass Incarceration: The




118. Nellis, supra note 39. 
119. Pelot-Hobbs, supra note 116. 
120. Nellis, supra note 39. 
121. See infra Section II.A.1. 
122. Pelot-Hobbs, supra note 116. 
123. Id; William Quigley, Louisiana Angola Penitentiary: Past Time to Close, 
163 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 203, 204 (2018).
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126 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
would “shock the conscience of any right thinking person.”124 Federal
District Judge Elmer Gordon West adopted Polozola’s findings and
ordered that Louisiana take serious steps to rectify the unconstitutional
conditions.125 Addressing the most immediate issue—overcrowding—the
Middle District of Louisiana ordered state-owned prisons to reduce the
number of prisoners in each facility by almost half.126 After the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Middle District’s decision,  the state
was left with only two options: prison reform or prison expansion.127 
Having observed the strain that increasingly long sentences were 
having on Louisiana’s already-burdened prison system, many actors inside
the Louisiana Department of Corrections (“DOC”) used the federally
mandated reform as an opportunity to advocate for expanded parole 
eligibility and shorter sentences.128 The DOC Secretary, the Angola
Warden, and several advocacy groups banded together to lobby for the
early release of prisoners, especially those serving life sentences.129 The 
District Attorney of New Orleans, Harry Connick, however, had just
introduced a well-financed “tough on crime” campaign that instituted
mandatory minimum sentences and reduced parole eligibility.130 
Connick’s largely successful lobbying quickly spun the then-current
narrative of reform into one of fear and retribution.131 By the 1980s,
Louisiana Governor David Treen ensured that jail construction took
priority over education, health care, and levees in the state budget—“not
out of a desire to make life easier for these convicts but to make sure that
no judge feels compelled to release somebody back into society who
should not be there just because prisons are overcrowded.”132 The focus of
124. See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1208–09 (5th Cir. 1977); Wilbert 
Rideau & Billy Sinclair, Prisoner Litigation: How it Began in Louisiana, 45 LA.
L. REV. 1060, 1074 (1985). The judge cited evidence of medical neglect, unsafe 
facilities, discrimination, and abuse. See Williams, 547 F.2d at 1208–9. 
125. Williams, 547 F.2d at 1208; Rideau & Sinclair, supra note 124, at 1074.
126. Pelot-Hobbs, supra note 116. 
127. Williams, 547 F.2d at 1208. See generally Pelot-Hobbs, supra note 116; 
Rideau & Sinclair, supra note 124, at 1074.




132. Id. (citing Comments on Governor David C. Treen’s Criminal Justice
Package for Possible Use by President Reagan in his September 28 Speech to the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Folder 4: Law Enforcement and 
Criminal Justice 1981, Box 796: L 1981, David Treen Papers, Tulane University).
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the state government thus shifted from moderating incarceration rates to
prioritizing their rise.133 
2. Capitalizing on the Situation: Local Actors Learned to Profit off of
Prisoners
The federal mandate requiring state prisons to reduce overcrowding
simply transferred the problem from the state to the parishes.134 
Accordingly, the mandate forced parish prisons, which parishes
themselves owned and operated, to accommodate the overflow of state
inmates while the DOC scrambled to create new prisons.135 Parishes, 
however, did not build prisons to handle the dramatic uptick in
population.136 By the 1980s, the mandate created a situation in Orleans
Parish so severe that the Sheriff began housing prisoners in tents outside
of the prison for lack of adequate space.137 To incentivize local prisons to 
house state prisoners and expand their facilities, the state raised the per
diem rate of $4.50 per day per prisoner in 1975 to $18.25 by 1980, which 
not only compensated parishes for housing state prisoners, but also made 
it profitable to do so.138 By 2012, local prisons housed over half of all state
inmates in Louisiana, a higher percentage than any other state.139 Private
companies quickly jumped at the opportunity as well, accepting state
money to house prisoners and prioritizing occupied beds to make a
profit.140 
The vast expansion of local prisons caused rapid prison growth and
obviated the need to moderate sentence lengths, as was required in other
states, to control incarceration rates.141 As a result, Louisiana slowly
developed one of the most severe sentencing structures in the country,
sending more people to prison to serve longer sentences than any other







139. Chang, supra note 32.
140. Id. 
141. Chang, supra note 76. 
142. Elizabeth Johnson, Life in Louisiana: People Aging in Prison Seek A
Second Chance, S. POVERTYL. CTR. (March 5, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/
news/2018/03/05/life-louisiana-people-aging-prison-seek-second-chance [https:/
/perma.cc/9ASQ-Y4Z4]. 
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128 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
for harsher sentences to maintain their own salaries.143 Today, the two 
groups that helped to build the incarceration empire, the Louisiana
Sheriffs’ Association and the LDAA, remain strong lobbyists against
sentence modification in Louisiana.144 
A culmination of tough-on-crime policies, prison expansion, and the
newly created “business” of incarceration incentivized local actors to
support legislation that sent more individuals to prison for longer.145 The 
Louisiana Legislature primarily increased sentence lengths through
decreased parole eligibility.146 New legislation progressively increased the
time that prisoners needed to wait before they could apply for parole and
began to categorically bar certain populations, such as violent offenders,
from parole eligibility.147 Eventually, the possibility of parole disappeared 
altogether for individuals serving life sentences, leaving Louisiana with a
growing population of older prisoners, many of whom had aged out of
crime and would pose little to no risk to society if released.148 The removal
of parole eligibility was instrumental in creating Louisiana’s state of mass
incarceration; thus, an increase in parole eligibility—specifically, to older,
rehabilitated, prisoners who have served the longest sentences—is 
necessary if Louisiana endeavors to fully embrace impactful criminal
justice reform.149 
B. How Parole Functions in Louisiana
When a parole board grants parole, the board concludes that there is
reasonable probability that the state can release the prisoner without 
detriment to the community.150 Parole is simply the carrying out of one’s 
143. Chang, supra note 32.
144. Maya Lau, Reducing Louisiana’s Prison Population Could Save Money
and Reduce Crime, ADVOCATE (June 17, 2016, 2:20 PM), https://www.the
advocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_0c3b2fe9-f5b2-55f3-9b4e
-a0ad13c29878.html [https://perma.cc/PC7Y-2MTG].
145. See generally Chang, supra note 32. 
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. SeeMauer et al., supra note 109, at 6.
149. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
23, at 57.
150. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4.1(B) (2018). As stated in Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 15:574.11, “Parole is an administrative device for the rehabilitation of
prisoners under supervised freedom from actual restraint, and the granting,
conditions, or revocation of parole rest in the discretion of the committee on
parole.” LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.11 (2018). Parole is an executive rather than a
judicial function, and a prisoner therefore has no due process rights in the granting
337366-LSU_80-1_Text.indd  135 11/27/19  9:28 AM





    
       
    
   
      
   
  
      
  
  
     
    
  
      
  
 
    
     
    
   
   
      
    






   
 
  
        
   
     
       
  
   
 
     
    
   
1292019] COMMENT
sentence outside of the prison walls, allowing a prisoner to return to
society while still under state supervision for the remainder of his
sentence.151 The paroled prisoner may live among the public, but he faces
certain restrictions on his freedom that the state and the parole board
dictate prior to release.152 Despite the onerous parole restrictions, most
prisoners revere parole as an opportunity to live a semblance of a normal
life.153 Parole offers an opportunity to visit loved ones, watch children
grow, hold a normal job, and, most importantly, make one’s own
choices.154 Parole provides a glimpse of the most fundamental value
stripped away in prison: freedom.155 
State statutes generally outline parole eligibility in relation to the type
of sentence.156 In addition to the standard parole provisions, many states
have a “geriatric” parole statute.157 Geriatric parole statutes grant parole 
eligibility to prisoners over a certain age who have served an enumerated
portion of their sentences.158 States often utilize geriatric parole as a way
to mitigate costs because older inmates carry a far lower public safety risk
or denying of parole. Kimberly Thomas & Paul Reingold, From Grace to Grids:
Rethinking Due Process Protection for Parole, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
213, 235 (2017); see also Bosworth v. Whitley, 627 So. 2d 629 (La. 1993)
(holding that a “lifer” had no liberty interest in parole because the state’s parole
statute gave sole discretion to the pardon board).
151. Hatheway, supra note 115, at 624.
152. See generally, Edward E. Rhine et al., Improving Parole Release in
America, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 96, 101 (2015). Such limitations frequently
include, among others, refraining from alcohol and drugs, observing a curfew,
living in DOC-approved housing, and completing community service. Id. at 102. 
A parole officer is assigned to the paroled prisoner to ensure compliance with the
mandated conditions. Id. In the case of a violation, the prisoner is usually sent
back to prison for a length of time that varies with the nature of the re-offense. Id. 
at 101. A technical violation (such as missing curfew) might result in a few nights
back in prison, whereas a felony offense will clearly result in a much more severe
re-sentencing. Id. 
153. See generally LIEM, supra note 106, at 84.
154. See id. at 84–85.
155. See generally id. at 119–54.
156. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(A) (2018). For example, in Louisiana, a
person serving time for a violent offense with no prior felony convictions is
eligible for parole after serving 65% of the sentence, whereas a person serving
time for a nonviolent offense is eligible for parole after serving 25% of the
sentence. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(A)(1)(a)–(b)(ii) (2018).
157. Nellis, supra note 39, at 6.
158. Id.
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130 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
if released and impose a heavier financial burden on the state than younger
inmates.159 
The Louisiana Legislature introduced the standards for Louisiana’s
current geriatric parole policy in Act 790 of the 1990 Louisiana Regular
Session, now incorporated into Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 15:574.4(A)(2).160 Louisiana’s geriatric parole statute allows prisoners
sentenced to at least 30 years in prison to obtain the possibility of parole
after serving 20 years of their sentence and reaching age 45.161 The statute,
however, renders prisoners serving life sentences ineligible for the
possibility of parole unless the governor commutes the sentence.162 
Therefore, a prisoner serving a 7,000-year sentence may be eligible for
parole after 20 years of his sentence, but parole eligibility on a life sentence
is impossible absent a pardon and commutation of the sentence by the
governor.163 
159. Id.
160. Act No. 790, 1990 La. Acts 1794 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 
15:574.4(A)(2) (1990)).
161. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(A)(2) (2018).
162. See id.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (1) of this Subsection or
any other law to the contrary, unless eligible for parole at an earlier date,
a person committed to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections
for a term or terms of imprisonment with or without benefit of parole for
thirty years or more shall be eligible for parole consideration upon
serving at least twenty years of the term or terms of imprisonment in
actual custody and upon reaching the age of forty-five. This provision
shall not apply to a person serving a life sentence unless the sentence has 
been commuted to a fixed term of years.
Id. The commutation of a sentence simply means that a life sentence was changed
to reflect some determinate time period; consequently, the process is frequently
referred to as “getting your numbers.” Shihadeh et al., supra note 29, at 4. In 
addition to lifers, Louisiana’s geriatric parole statute also excludes individuals
convicted of armed robbery, crimes of violence, or sex offenses. LA. REV. STAT.
§ 15:574.4(A)(2) (2018).
163. Mauer et al., supra note 109, at 6. A pardon does not mean that an inmate 
is “forgiven” or can walk away free, but rather that the individual’s sentence is
changed from an indeterminate sentence to a determinate sentence—from life to
50 years—so that the individual is then parole eligible. Shihadeh et al., supra note
29, at 4. For example, if the governor pardons a lifer who served 45 years and
commutes his life sentence to 40 years, the lifer would be released without
supervision from the state. If the governor only commutes the sentence to 80
years, the prisoner would have to serve another 35 years, but he would be eligible 
for parole. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(A)(2) (2018).
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1312019] COMMENT
Under the current statute, an individual serving life may only achieve
parole through the pardon process.164 If, after reviewing the prisoner’s file
and hearing his case, the Board of Pardons recommends the prisoner for
pardon, the recommendation goes to the governor’s desk for signing.165 
The governor’s decision to grant or deny the request for pardon, however,
is highly political and greatly dependent on who is in office.166 If the
governor decides to grant the pardon, the governor does so by commuting
the life sentence to a numerical sentence, a process colloquially referred 
to as “getting your numbers.”167 If the prisoner has not already served the 
length of the commuted sentence, he will then apply for parole and restate
his case before the Committee on Parole.168 The Committee on Parole
consists of the same five people on the Board of Pardons, with the addition
of two governor-appointed members who do not serve on the Board of
164. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(A)(2) (2018). The Louisiana Legislature has 
taken affirmative measures to increase the difficulty and decrease the chances of
a prisoner applying for a pardon. Mauer et al., supra note 109, at 6. During the
1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention, the legislature added that the governor
cannot commute a sentence absent a recommendation from the newly created
Board of Pardons that the prisoner is pardon-eligible. In 1995, the legislature
again increased the difficulty of receiving a pardon by stipulating that at least one
member of the board must be a representative from a Louisiana nonprofit victim’s
advocacy organization. Two years later, the legislature passed a law requiring that
four of the five members agree upon a recommendation before it could reach the
governor. Id.
165. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:572.5(A) (2018). The Board of Pardons consists of
five members that the governor appoints who serve for as long as the appointing
governor is in office. Id. § 15:572.1(A)(1)(a). In deciding whether to recommend 
an applicant for pardon, the Board of Pardons reviews, among other things, the 
records surrounding the facts and circumstances of the incarcerating offense, prior
criminal record, social history, prison record. See id. § 15:572.5(A).
166. Julia O’Donoghue, John Bel Edwards Reduces 22 Prisoners’ Terms— 
And Gets Angola’s Attention, TIMES-PICAYUNE (March 9, 2017), https://www
.nola.com/news/politics/article_13317f8f-7f6b-55e5-a4ea-455c7456dbb9.html
[https://perma.cc/7QQD-PNT7]. In his first year in office, Governor John Bel
Edwards, a Democrat, commuted the sentences of 22 inmates. Id. Bobby Jindal,
Governor Edwards’ Republican predecessor, commuted a total of three sentences
during his eight-year term. Id. 
167. Shihadeh et al., supra note 29, at 4.
168. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.2.
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132 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Pardons.169 In 2016, the Committee granted parole to 44% of applicants.170 
Under Louisiana’s current geriatric parole statute, therefore, a lifer’s only
chance at parole eligibility involves going through the lengthy,
unpredictable, and often unsuccessful pardon process.171 
If the Louisiana Legislature expanded parole eligibility to lifers, an
individual’s release would depend on an objective review of his or her
character rather than the political persuasion of the current governor.172 
Additionally, bypassing the pardon process increases administrative
efficiency because five of the seven members of the Committee on Parole
comprise the Board of Pardons.173 The applicant, therefore, would avoid
the same evaluation twice by the same five people.174 Considering that a 
significant amount of evidence indicates that lifers pose a low public safety
risk if released, the current exclusion of lifers from Louisiana’s parole
statute is unnecessary and inefficient.175 The desire to bring efficiency and
administrative justice to Louisiana’s parole system, unfortunately, is not
universal.
C. Recent Efforts to Modify the Statute Were Quickly Shot Down 
During the 2018 Louisiana Regular Legislative Session, Senator Troy
Carter introduced Senate Bill 269, which proposed an amendment to
include lifers under Louisiana’s geriatric parole statute.176 The amendment
would have allowed parole eligibility for lifers who had no prior violent
convictions, had not been convicted of first-degree murder, had reached
the age of 50, and had served at least 30 years of their sentences.177 Under
Senator Carter’s proposed bill, eligible lifers would have gained the
169. See id. “The crime victim or the victim’s family, a victim advocacy group,
and the district attorney or his representatives, may appear before the committee
on parole” in person or by telephone for purposes of voicing an opinion as to the
parole ruling. Id. § 15:574.1(A)(2).
170. LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRECTIONS, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT:
LOUISIANA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 32 (2016).
171. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(A)(2); O’Donoghue, supra note
166.
172. See generally O’Donoghue, supra note 166.
173. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.2.
174. See id.
175. See discussion infra Part III.
176. Mark Mallard, Louisiana Legislators Refuse to Loosen Sentencing and 
Parole Rules, ADVOCATE (April 17, 2018, 11:41 PM), https://www.theadvocate
.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_b40a5192-42c2-11e8-b6aa-73e
3c8850e70.html [https://perma.cc/6XXU-VEP2].
177. S.B. 269, 2018 Reg. Leg. Sess. (La. 2018).
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1332019] COMMENT
possibility of parole without undergoing the often fruitless pardon
process.178 If the legislature had passed the bill, the state could have saved 
an estimated $16.7 million per year.179 To the state’s detriment, however,
the Senate Judiciary Committee quickly added an amendment to Senate
Bill 269 that excluded prisoners convicted of second-degree murder and
first-degree rape from eligibility.180 The amendment, as a byproduct of the
LDAA’s successful lobbying, severely “watered down” the bill and
drastically narrowed the number of individuals the bill could affect.181 
Even with the amendment, however, the bill failed on the Senate floor due
to a fear of backlash from political opponents and constituents for
releasing “violent criminals.”182 
Senate Bill 269 demonstrates that at least some legislators
acknowledge the need for deeper reform beyond the JRI legislation.183 
Specifically, the legislature is beginning to recognize the incontrovertible
evidence that the social and fiscal cost of life without parole for most
prisoners, including violent offenders, is simply unnecessary.184 
III. AN INCLUSIVE PROPOSAL: EXPANDING GERIATRIC PAROLE
ELIGIBILITY TO LIFERS
The Louisiana Legislature must reform its use of life sentences if it is 
truly committed to ending its practice of mass incarceration.185 Of the 
approximately 4,937 prisoners currently serving life sentences in
Louisiana, many are older, rehabilitated, and no longer pose a threat to
public safety.186 Continued incarceration of individuals who have “aged
out of crime” perpetuates Louisiana’s practice of over-incarceration and
significantly misallocates resources.187 The National Research Council
defines an excessive sentence as one that incarcerates an individual
178. See id.
179. Mallard, supra note 176.
180. S.B. 269, 2018 Reg. Leg. Sess. (La. 2018).
181. Mallard, supra note 176. In fact, the amendment diminished the bill’s
impact so substantially that the executive director of the LDAA stated, “I guess
we’re still opposed, but it’s hard for me to get up here and argue against the bill
because I’m not sure what it does.” O’Donoghue, supra note 23. 
182. See S.B. 269, 2018 Reg. Leg. Sess. (La. 2018).
183. Mallard, supra note 176.
184. Id.
185. See generally Nellis, supra note 24; TASK FORCE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 57.
186. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 16. 
187. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 147.
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134 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
beyond the time necessary to achieve desired penological goals.188 
Louisiana’s use of life without parole as a mandatory minimum fails to
adequately fulfill the penological goals of incapacitation, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution.189 Furthermore, Louisiana’s current
geriatric parole statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:574.4(A)(2) (“Act
790”), mandates the administration of excessive and unjust sentences.190 
The recent Supreme Court cases declaring juvenile life without parole
unconstitutional, as well as Louisiana’s vote to end non-unanimous juries,
demonstrate that public support is shifting away from strictly punitive
polices that do little to further public safety.191 As Louisiana’s current
geriatric parole statute yields only diminishing returns for the state— 
creating a high cost and producing no societal benefit—the time has
arrived for the Louisiana Legislature to amend Act 790 to expand parole
eligibility for lifers.192 
A. The Rising Cost of Life Without Parole
Louisiana’s denial of parole eligibility to lifers creates a significant
misallocation of valuable resources that the legislature could better
allocate toward programs proven to increase public safety.193 Not only is
the legislature’s decision to spend resources by incarcerating older
offenders inefficient, but it also requires an increasing amount of taxpayer
dollars.194 The cost of incarceration is rising, not only from the number of
people behind bars, but also because of the prison population’s changing
demographics.195 As the world’s population grows older, so do the world’s
prison populations.196 Correctional facilities around the world are trying to
combat the “aging crisis,” but nowhere is the impact more severe than in
188. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 326.
189. See generally discussion infra Section III.B.
190. See generally discussion infra Section III.B.
191. See generally discussion infra Section III.B.
192. See infra, Sections III.A–B.
193. See Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 147. For example, measures such as 
increased police presence and greater access to mental health services and
substance abuse programming have a much more significant impact on public
safety than sentence length. See Mauer et al., supra note 109, at 18–19;
Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 147. For more information on the negligible impact
that incarceration has on public safety, see discussion infra Section III.B.2.
194. See Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 149.
195. Id.
196. Id. “In the United Kingdom, the overall prison population grew by 51%
between 2000 and 2009, while the population over the age of sixty grew by
216%.” Bedard et al., supra note 31, at 917.
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1352019] COMMENT
the United States.197 A population of aging baby boomers, coupled with 
the American sentencing scheme that keeps more prisoners behind bars
for longer, is placing an increasing strain on state and federal resources.198 
In less than 20 years, “the total [United States] prison population doubled
while the number of incarcerated individuals aged 55 or older increased
by 300%.”199 Since 2000, prisoners over the age of 45 represent the fastest
growing population in both state and federal prisons.200 This growing 
population of geriatric inmates places an incredible burden on state 
budgets and resources.201 
Elderly inmates are costly to accommodate.202 In order to provide 
adequate care to aging prisoners, correctional facilities must tend to
extensive medical needs and provide increased care.203 Prisoners often
experience “accelerated aging” from the toll of harsh living conditions and
suffer age-related maladies earlier in life than non-incarcerated individuals
of the same age.204 Prisoners in the United States, however, are the only
group of people with a constitutionally guaranteed right to health care.205 
Given the mandated quality of health care in penal systems, state prisoners 
actually experience a lower mortality rate than that of the general
population.206 As a product of the rising level of geriatric prisoners who 
are now living longer in prisons, states must spend more on prison medical
care and facility resources, creating sizable costs for both the correctional
system and the taxpayers.207 
The growing elderly population in Louisiana prisons poses a true fiscal
problem.208 Louisiana has a rate of life sentences twice the national
average, and almost all individuals serving life in Louisiana will likely die
in prison under the current parole eligibility statute.209 The previous 
warden of Angola prison—which is home to 84.1% of the lifers in
Louisiana—has even complained about his prison “turning into a nursing
197. Bedard et al., supra note 31, at 917.
198. Timothy Curtin, The Continuing Problem of America’s Aging Prison
Population, 15 ELDER L.J. 473, 479 (2007).
199. Bedard et al., supra note 31, at 917.
200. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 149.
201. Id.
202. LIEM, supra note 106, at 4.
203. Id. 
204. Id.
205. Curtin, supra note 198, at 475–76.
206. Id. at 476.
207. Id. at 473.
208. Nellis, supra note 24. 
209. Id.
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136 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
home.”210 Louisiana spends on average about $58 per day, or $65,000 per
year, for an inmate to stay in prison in Louisiana.211 This number rises to 
$80,000 per year if the inmate is sick.212 Under the first draft of Senate Bill
269, which provided parole eligibility for lifers but excluded individuals
convicted of first-degree murder, 565 inmates in Louisiana would have
been eligible for consideration before the parole board.213 If all 565
inmates were released on parole, the state would save approximately $3.5
million.214 Expanding Act 790 to allow parole eligibility to lifers would
save the state and taxpayers significant amounts of money, 70% of which
would be reinvested into improved public safety measures.215 Considering
an extensive amount of research proves that the continued incarceration of
older, rehabilitated lifers does nothing to improve public safety, 
Louisiana’s refusal to extend parole eligibility to lifers is unfounded.216 
B. An Unjustified Sentence: The Evidence Undermining the Exclusion of
Lifers from Act 790
The practice of incarceration relies on four basic justifications: 
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.217 A life-
without-parole sentence reflects a determination that the individual is 
incapable of rehabilitation, that he or she would be a threat to public safety
on release, and that the crime is one that warrants a punishment severe
210. Giovanna Shay,Double-Edged Pairing Knives: Human Rights Dilemmas
for Special Populations, 38 ABAHUM. RTS. (2011); FACT SHEET, LA.DEP’T PUB.
SAFETY & CORRECTIONS 38 (June 30, 2018).
211. Hearing on S.B. 269 Before S. Judiciary Comm. B., 2018 Reg. Leg. Sess., 
(April 10, 2018), http://senate.la.gov/video/videoarchive.asp?v=senate/2018/04
/041018JUDB_0 [https://perma.cc/RK8F-QH3F].
212. Id. For a comparison, Louisiana spent approximately $11,038 per student
for public elementary and secondary education in 2016. 2016 Annual Survey of
School System Finance: Per Pupil Amounts for Current Spending of Public
Elementary-Secondary School Systems by State, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/school-finances/secondary-educ
ation-finance.html [https://perma.cc/68CS-VTWG] (last revised May 17, 2018).
213. Hearing on S.B. 269, supra note 211. 
214. Id.
215. JRI PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra note 85, at 38.
216. See PFAFF, supra note 21, at 191.
217. John R. Mills, Anna M. Dorn & Amelia Courtney Hritz, Juvenile Life
Without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway, 
65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 540 (2016).
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1372019] COMMENT
enough to deter others.218 Although the justifications are valid, increasing
amounts of evidence reveal that life-without-parole sentences do not
effectively achieve these goals.219 In fact, the evidence indicates that
longer sentences are actually counterproductive—they do not increase
public safety but instead promote high social and monetary costs.220 
1. Incapacitation 
Keeping older prisoners behind bars fails to fulfill the incarceration
function of incapacitation.221 Incapacitation rests on the notion that the
offender presents a danger to society and that the state must remove him
to keep the community safe.222 Incapacitating an individual longer than
necessary, however, creates diminishing returns for the correctional
system—resulting in a low impact on public safety and high cost of
incarceration.223 The key inquiry thus becomes: at what sentence length is
the function of incapacitation served and the individual rehabilitated?224 
For individuals serving a life sentence in Louisiana, the state answered the 
question with the blanket parole exclusion encapsulated in Act 790.225 
Louisiana’s current geriatric parole statute embraces a static theory of
violence—the idea that an individual will always present the same level of
danger to society as depicted by the nature of the crime.226 A considerable 
amount of contrary evidence, however, demonstrates that the propensity
to engage in criminal activity is not static but, rather, fluctuates over the
course of a lifespan.227 Studies repeatedly confirm that criminal activity
decreases after late adolescence into early adulthood as individuals “age
218. Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Delaying A Second Chance: The Declining
Prospects for Parole on Life Sentences, SENT’G PROJECT 11 (2017). 
219. See PFAFF, supra note 21, at 191.
220. Id.




225. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:54.4 (2018).
226. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 190. Such a determination rests on the assertion
that individuals who engage in violence are “inherently violent, rather than [the
idea that they are people] who have engaged in violence at a particular moment
in time.” Id. Life without parole, by definition, is a judgment that an individual
will be capable of the same level of criminal activity throughout his lifetime and
thus requires a lifetime of incapacitation. Id.
227. SeeRaymond E. Collins,Onset and Desistance in Criminal Neurobiology
and the Age-Crime Relationship, 39(3) J. OFFENDERREHABILITATION 1, 2 (2004).
337366-LSU_80-1_Text.indd  144 11/27/19  9:28 AM




    
   





   
 
     
   
  
     
     
   
    
 
    
  
     
    
 
   
   
     
   
  
 
        
     
   
 
     
     
     
    
      
       
     
        
138 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
out of crime.”228 Because evidence shows that most individuals with life
sentences will age out of crime, Louisiana’s practice of excluding lifers
from parole eligibility results in questionable public benefits and places a
financial and social burden on the state’s systems.229 
a. Growing Up and Out of Crime: Predicting Criminality with the 
Age Crime Curve 
The relationship between age and crime is arguably the most widely
accepted fact about crime.230 Approximately 100 years of studies 
examining the relationship between criminality and age among all
individuals prove that an individual who engaged in violence at a
particular time, whether it be murder or some lesser offense, will most
likely lose the desire to engage in criminal activity by the time he or she 
reaches 45.231 Scholars researching the relationship between age and crime
consistently find that the data forms a bell curve, demonstrating an inverse 
relationship between the two factors.232 This relationship is commonly
referred to as the age–crime curve, and it is of vital importance in
determining how long to incapacitate prisoners.233 
Although researchers have noted the interaction between age and
crime since the early 1900s, sociologists Travis Hirschi and Michael
Gottfredson popularized the age–crime curve in the 1980s.234 Hirschi and
Gottfredson demonstrated “that across historical time and cultures,
involvement in criminal behavior shows a rapid increase at puberty age,
followed by a slow decline after reaching its peak” in late adolescence.235 
Hirschi and Gottfredson sought to disprove existing theories that attributed
the correlation between age and crime to extraneous variables other than
age itself.236 Hirschi and Gottfredson isolated numerous variables, such as
race and environment, to examine how those external factors influenced
228. SeeMones & Clegg, supra note 30.
229. Ghandnoosh, supra, note 218, at 11.
230. LIEM, supra note 106, at 12. The only variance among the curve was that 
the peak of the curve was earlier for property offenses rather than for violent
crime, which peaked later. See Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and 
the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552 (Nov. 1983).
231. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 191.
232. Mones & Clegg, supra note 30. 
233. LIEM, supra note 106, at 12.
234. See Hirschi & Gottfredson, supra note 230.
235. See id.; Mones & Clegg, supra note 30. 
236. See Hirschi & Gottfredson, supra note 230, at 552–54.
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1392019] COMMENT
the shape of the age–crime curve.237 After multiple tests, the authors found 
that only one factor slightly skewed the shape of the bell curve: the type
of crime committed.238 Apart from the type of crime, Hirschi and 
Gottfredson concluded that the age–crime curve is invariant across
variables and is constant across populations.239 The age–crime curve thus 
shows that increased age correlates with a decrease in criminal activity,
regardless of upbringing or other societal factors.240 
Scholars have since repeated the 1980s study numerous times, each
time revealing the well-known bell curve, which shows a peak of criminal
activity between ages 16 to 24 and a steady decline until the ages of 45 to
50, at which time the curve nears zero.241 Subsequent studies have proven
that even the small subset of the population labeled as “persistent
offenders” or “career criminals” age out of crime.242 Further, attempts to
identify which offenders will be “persistent” based upon criminal history
have been largely unsuccessful, indicating that criminality at one point in
time does not indicate criminality in the future.243 Overall, the studies
demonstrate that long sentences serve minimal utility, as criminal careers
are proven to be relatively short, ranging from about 5 to 10 years.244 The 
237. See generally id.
238. See id. at 557. Hirschi and Gottfredson found that criminality for personal
offenses peaked slightly later than it did for property offenses. Id.
239. Id. at 560.
240. Id. 
241. Mones & Clegg, supra note 30.
242. See Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Life-Course Desisters?
Trajectories of Crime Among Delinquent Boys Followed to Age 70, 41 
CRIMINOLOGY 555 (2003).
243. Id. at 569.
244. Alex R. Piquero et al., Criminal Career Patterns, in JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND
PREVENTION 37–38 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2012). The relationship between age and crime is irrefutable, but the explanation
for the effect that age has on criminality is not. Mones & Clegg, supra note 30. 
Some scholars take a primarily sociological approach to explain the age–crime 
relationship. For example, many scholars believe there are turning points within
an individual’s life where they either obtain social capital or go through
personality changes that result in a greater sense of self-control. Id. The “social
control” theory posits that, as people age, they tend to take on more serious roles
or acquire greater responsibilities. Whether role-changes occur due to
employment, families, or community, individuals with greater responsibility will 
generally begin to consider the long-term effects of their actions and are more
likely to think of crime as risky rather than rewarding. Id. Explanatory theories,
however, are at odds with Hirschi and Gottfredson’s original theory of
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140 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
steadfast nature and predictability of the age–crime curve exposes the low
utility in policies that bar parole eligibility for older offenders.245 
b. Recidivism Rates Demonstrate that Incarcerated Individuals Also 
Age Out of Crime
Recidivism rates further demonstrate that incarcerated individuals also
age out of crime and therefore play a critical role in demonstrating the
utility of an Act 790 expansion.246 Recidivism refers to “acts that resulted 
in the re-arrest, reconviction, or return to prison with or without a new
sentence during a defined period following the prisoner’s release.”247 Most
scholars use recidivism rates as a means to determine which groups of
offenders are most likely to re-offend and therefore be kept in prison, 
versus the groups of offenders who pose the least risk to society if
released.248 Recidivism rates, therefore, demonstrate the effect of age on
criminality, as well as the influence that the type of conviction and length
of time served has upon the likelihood to re-offend.249 
The fact that older prisoners convicted of homicides have some of the
lowest recidivism rates directly undermines Louisiana’s current exclusion
of lifers from parole eligibility.250 Specifically, older homicide offenders
invariability, which states that there is no social variable that can alter the age– 
crime curve. See generally Hirschi & Gottfredson, supra note 230. Other theories
attempting to explain the age–crime curve rely on biological and physiological 
changes in the body that may have a substantial effect on rebellious and antisocial 
behaviors. LIEM, supra note 106, at 12. For example, a 2003 study by Raymond
Collins found that a flux in the hormones of serotonin and dopamine may play a
large role in the inclination for criminal activity. Collins, supra note 227, at 4.
Serotonin runs through the cerebral cortex, which includes the region of the brain
“‘that determines how the brain acts on its knowledge’ . . . [and influences]
judgement, comportment, executive function and motivation.” Id. (quoting K.I.
KAPLAN, & B.J. SADOCK, SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY: BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES/CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 94 (1999)). Low serotonin levels and high
dopamine levels are both highly correlated with aggressive behavior. Id. As 
people age, serotonin levels rise and dopamine levels fall, causing a decrease in
violent and aggressive behavior that correlates with the fall in criminal activity on
the age–crime curve. Id.
245. Ghandnoosh, supra note 218. 
246. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 147.
247. Shihadeh et al., supra note 29, at 2.
248. Id.
249. See generally id.
250. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 147.
337366-LSU_80-1_Text.indd  147 11/27/19  9:28 AM




     
 
  
    
  







   
    
   
   
    
 
    
 
   
   
      
  
   
   
    
     
    
  
   
   
 
   
   




    
    
   
1412019] COMMENT
are categorically the least likely to re-offend.251 If these offenders do re-
offend, the specific recidivism rate—the likelihood that they will commit 
the same crime—is between 1% and 3%.252 Studies consistently support
the assertion that older, violent offenders, particularly prisoners who have
served longer sentences, pose an incredibly low public safety risk.253 
Louisiana’s exclusion of lifers from parole eligibility, therefore, does not
improve public safety.254 
c. Louisiana Recidivism Rates Highlight the Low Risk of Expanded 
Parole Eligibility to Lifers
A Louisiana study of recidivism rates amongst paroled prisoners
serving long sentences directly supports the argument for an expansion of
Act 790.255 In 2013, the Crime and Policy Evaluation Research Group
(CAPER)256 examined recidivism rates of prisoners eligible for parole
under Act 790 and lifers who had become parole eligible after receiving a
gubernatorial pardon.257 For all prisoners in this category, the recidivism
rate was 19.8% for a five-year period, or one-fifth of all offenders.258 When 
the authors of the study excluded technical parole violations from the
results—violations such as missing curfew or consuming alcohol—the
recidivism rates decreased to 8.02%.259 Thus, half of the offenders under
251. LIEM, supra note 106, at 12.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 2. For example, in a California study of 860 paroled lifers, each of
whom was serving a sentence for homicide and had been on parole since 1995,
less than 1% returned to prison for new felonies, and none of the 860 recidivated
for a crime deserving a life sentence. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 147.
254. See generally LIEM, supra note 106, at 2.
255. Shihadeh et al., supra note 29, at 2.
256. CAPER is an informal network of policy researchers at Louisiana State 
University who “seek to promote collaboration in criminology and related areas by
combining [Louisiana State University] research talent across a variety of fields.”
Crime and Policy Evaluation Research Group, LSU DEP’T SOCIOLOGY, 
https://www.lsu.edu/hss/sociology/research/CAPER/caper.php [https://perma.cc/QX
2W-T8LT] (last visited, Sept. 14, 2019). The majority of the group’s research focuses
on the areas of crime and policy in Louisiana. Id.
257. Id. at 3–4. The authors utilized a data file consisting of 671 records of
individuals eligible for parole under Act 790 and of 217 records of individuals
who had become parole eligible after receiving a pardon from the governor. Id. 
At the time the study was conducted, not all of the individuals in the data files had
been released. Id. at 4.
258. Id. at 5.
259. Id.
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142 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Act 790 who returned to custody after release did so because of a mere 
technical violation.260 
The recidivism rates for paroled prisoners convicted of armed robbery,
second-degree murder, and first-degree murder are particularly
noteworthy.261 The CAPER study revealed a five-year recidivism rate of
4% for individuals convicted of first-degree murder—2% of which was 
technical. Moreover, the study showed a 5.8% recidivism rate for those
convicted of armed robbery, not including technical violations. Lastly, the
CAPER study found a 2% recidivism rate for those convicted of second-
degree murder, 2% of which was technical.262 The non-technical
recidivism rate for convicted second-degree murderers held steady at
0%.263 Not one individual convicted of second-degree murder returned to
prison within the five-year window.264 
The length of incarceration before release, as well as the age of the
prisoner, significantly impacted recidivism rates.265 Of all offenders 
granted parole eligibility under Act 790, offenders having served over 26
years of their sentence had a recidivism rate of almost 0%, regardless of
the type of crime.266 Of the second-degree murderers who committed
technical violations on parole, all were under 47.267 Of the 46 first-degree 
murderers released on parole, only two committed new offenses, one of
whom was over 50.268 The CAPER study authors concluded that the low
recidivism rates were due, in large part, to the advent of “criminal
menopause,” in which most of the offenders had either become
disinterested or too old to engage in crime by the time they were released
on parole.269 The study found that the remarkably low recidivism rates
signified that offenders who had served at least 26 years were possible
260. Id.





266. Id. at 3.
267. Id.
268. Id. Additionally, the CAPER study found that the recidivism rate for
armed robbers released under the age of 50 was 22.1%, while the recidivism rate
for armed robbers released over the age of 50 was 6.98%. Id. The authors
considered this finding consistent with the second and first-degree murder
recidivism rate. Id. at 6.
269. Id. at 3.
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1432019] COMMENT
candidates for early release because they were unlikely to compromise
public safety.270 
The low recidivism rate associated with paroled lifers undermines
Louisiana’s current policy barring lifers from parole eligibility and 
highlights the need for reform.271 The proposed expansion of Act 790
would extend parole to prisoners over age 50 who have served at least 20 
years of a life sentence.272 Currently, in Louisiana, 43% of all offenders 
released from prison will return to prison within five years.273 In contrast, 
the CAPER study demonstrated that older lifers present only a minor risk
of recidivism.274 Lifers granted parole under the proposed amendment to
Act 790 would therefore pose a significantly lower public safety risk than
half of all prisoners that Louisiana already releases from prison.275 
To efficiently serve the purpose of incapacitation, inmates should not
be imprisoned longer than necessary to assure public safety.276 The age– 
crime curve and recidivism rates consistently demonstrate that paroled
lifers over the age of 50 pose an extremely low public safety risk.277 
Louisiana’s exclusion of older lifers from parole eligibility ensures the
over-incapacitation of prisoners and is therefore both inefficient and 
excessive.278 Advocates for long sentences argue that, even if the sentences
over-incapacitate, excessive sentences still serve the purpose of
deterrence.279 Again, such arguments in favor of long sentences are
undermined by significant evidence to the contrary.280 
2. Deterrence
As most prisoners over 50 years old will age out of crime and pose a
low risk to society if released, the justification for mandatory life-without-




273. LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRECTIONS, RECIDIVISM, ADMISSIONS,
AND RELEASES 38 (2018).
274. Shihadeh et al., supra note 29, at 7.
275. Id.
276. See generallyMauer, supra note 25, at 2.
277. See generally Mones & Clegg, supra note 30; Sampson & Laub, supra
note 242, at 569.
278. See generally Mauer, supra note 25, at 2; Shihadeh et al., supra note 29, 
at 7.
279. See generally LIEM, supra note 106, at 19–20.
280. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 132–40.
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144 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
yet, “no reliable evidence is available that such an effect is sufficiently
large to justify the costs of long prison sentences.”281 The classical theory
of deterrence rests on the idea that the expected personal cost of
punishment to the offender exceeds the benefits of offending.282 Modern
sentencing laws, however, over-emphasize the impact that incremental
increases in severity, such as life with parole versus life without parole,
have upon criminal deterrence.283 Additionally, fluctuations in crime rates
show little correlation between crime and changes in sentencing,
demonstrating that severe sentences do little to further the goal of crime 
prevention.284 The exclusion of lifers from the current version of Act 790
has a negligible deterrent effect on future crime, therefore eliminating any 
empirically founded argument for the continued exclusion of lifers from
parole eligibility in Louisiana.285 
a. Misapprehension: Severe Punishments Fail to Deter Crime 
By imposing a severe sentence like life without parole on individuals
who have participated in what the legislature deems abhorrent activity, the 
legislature hopes to deter other individuals who may consider that
particular crime.286 Empirical evidence routinely demonstrates, however, 
that the certainty, not the severity, of punishment carries a far greater
deterrent effect.287 Thus, the certainty and swiftness of apprehension deters
crime, rather than the length of the sentence imposed.288 Certainty of
punishment in modern society requires that the victim report the crime and
bring it to an officer’s attention, that the police apprehend the correct
individual, and that courts successfully prosecute and sentence the
offender.289 According to a 2017 report by the PEW Research Center,
victims only report half of all violent crimes each year to the police, and
most of those reported crimes do not successfully make it through to the
281. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 147 (quoting Durlauf and Nagin,
Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 13, 38 (2011)).
282. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 153.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 147.
286. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 153.
287. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 148.
288. Id.
289. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 153–54.
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1452019] COMMENT
prosecution stage.290 Uncertain apprehension—as seen in the United
States—significantly reduces the deterrent effect of any crime, regardless
of the severity of punishment.291 
Further, marginal differences in the severity of punishment are
unlikely to produce any additional deterrent effect because the
“deterrence-through-harsher-punishment” theory largely overestimates
the rational calculus of the potential offender.292 First, the theory assumes
that the individual has actual knowledge of the consequences and
understands the sentence associated with the criminal actions if caught,
which is rarely true.293 Second, impulsivity is one of the most “well-
documented risk factors for criminal behavior.”294 Impulsive actions
accompany a near-sighted view of the future and do not involve weighing
potential consequences—especially not consequences 30 years down the
line.295 Apprehension, rather than length of incarceration, is therefore the 
more feared consequence, in large part because of the immediacy of its
effect.296 Once arrested, social consequences, such as ostracism, lost job
opportunities, family pressures, and responsibilities, become a reality
regardless of innocence or guilt.297 The fear of apprehension is far more
immediate—and thus a greater deterrent—than the exact length of the jail
sentence associated with a particular crime.298 The added punishment of
denied parole eligibility for lifers is thus unlikely to carry additional
deterrence or produce any added public safety.299 
b. The Data Do Not Lie: Severe Sentencing Does Not Increase
Public Safety 
In addition to the sociological argument, crime rates unambiguously
emphasize the weak deterrent effect of long punishments.300 Empirical
290. John Gramlich,Most Violent and Property Crimes in the U.S. Go Unsolved, 
PEW RES. CTR. (March 1, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03
/01/most-violent-and-property-crimes-in-the-u-s-go-unsolved/ [https://perma.cc/4Z
TU-6VSA].
291. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 153–54.
292. Id. at 155; PFAFF, supra note 21, at 190.
293. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 155.
294. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 194.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 190.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 142–45.
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146 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
evidence repeatedly demonstrates that harsh sentences have, if anything,
only a minor impact on crime.301 Although crime rates have steadily fallen
in the United States since the country’s criminal peak in the 1990s, the rate
of violent crime has actually risen.302 In 2014, the national rate of violent
crime reached twice that of the 1990s.303 Following the national trend, 
Louisiana had the highest murder rate in the country from 1989 until
2012—coincidentally the same year that Louisiana’s incarceration rate
reached an all-time high.304 Individuals convicted of first- or second-
degree murder when Louisiana was the murder capital of the world were
also sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.305 If the sentences
had any deterrent effect, the community did not feel it.306 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the deterrence justification for
mandatory life without parole, at least in Louisiana, is largely futile in its
attempt to increase public safety.307 Therefore, there remains no additional
public safety argument for denying parole eligibility to prisoners who have
aged out of crime.308 An expansion of Act 790, on the other hand, would
inject increased funds directly into communities throughout Louisiana to
increase public safety and would allow rehabilitated offenders the
opportunity to positively contribute to society.309 
3. Rehabilitation
Many of the individuals sentenced to life in Louisiana would likely be
parole eligible if they were convicted in almost any other state.310 
Compared to other states, Louisiana has taken a minority position on the
ability of certain offenders to reform.311 A life-without-parole sentence, by
definition, is a determination that an individual cannot be rehabilitated.312 
301. PFAFF, supra note 21, at 12.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Turkington, supra note 35. 
305. Id.
306. Id. 
307. See generally id.
308. Id.; PFAFF, supra note 21, at 12.
309. See generally JRI PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra note 85, at 38.
310. Only six states do not allow parole eligibility to individuals serving life
sentences, and only one other state, Mississippi, gives a life-without-parole
sentence to individuals convicted of second-degree murder. TASK FORCE REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 56.
311. See generally id.
312. William W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than
Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1132 (2010).
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1472019] COMMENT
Although it is often difficult to accept that individuals capable of
committing atrocious crimes are also capable of rehabilitation and reform, 
Louisiana should follow the lead of the other 44 states that grant parole 
eligibility to lifers and recognize the evidence indicating that rehabilitation
is not only possible, but highly probable.313 
a. The Non-Unique Experience of Prison as a Turning Point
The array of effects that incarceration might have upon an
individual—such as difficulty maintaining employment, development of
medical and psychological issues, and increased likelihood of returning to 
prison—are highly studied and widely known.314 There is, however, a 
shocking lack of research documenting the experiences of individuals
incarcerated for longer periods of time.315 Where research does exist, it
documents drastic transformations in prisoners who have served long
sentences.316 
Seeking to fill the gap in literature, Marieke Liem, Senior Researcher
at Leiden University, spent more than two years interviewing over 60 men
and women convicted of homicide, all serving life sentences and either
released on parole or returned to prison after release.317 The study hoped
to discover the factors that determine whether a lifer will be successful on 
parole.318 In her study, Liem found that all of the interviewees, both in and
out of prison, cited a period during their incarceration when they reached
a “turning point” at which they turned away from a life of crime and
accepted an alternative life.319 
The provocation for the sudden desire to change ranged from person
to person.320 Some individuals described prison as their first opportunity
to reflect on their lives and to address what was leading them astray.321 For
others, accepting a lifetime behind bars required finding new purpose and
313. LIEM, supra note 106, at 2.
314. Id. at 4.
315. Id. at 5.
316. Id.
317. Id. at x–xi.
318. Id. at 6–7.Marieke Liem conducted the study through a series of personal
interviews with each offender. The interviewees were comprised of offenders
from across the country, excluding the six states where life does not carry the
possibility of parole. Id. at 4.
319. Id. at 9.
320. Id. at 100.
321. Id.
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148 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
meaning in daily life.322 Despite the various factors that led to each
person’s epiphany, all of the individuals described a cognitive shift and an
effort to distance themselves from their old lives.323 The interviewees also 
cited the importance of “vehicles of change” in their transformation, which
can include education, religion, or a work-release program.324 The 
interviewees found that the various programs “facilitated the development
of a ‘replacement self,’ or a more socially acceptable identity.”325 The 
study concluded that because nearly all interviewees shared a story of
rehabilitation, the lack of cognitive transformation did not lead to the
parole failures, but rather a sense of being “doomed from the start” when 
facing the societal hindrances to reentry.326 As lifers in Louisiana have 
greater access to programming and reentry services than most prison
populations, Louisiana already has many of the mechanisms in place to
ensure that lifers are successful on parole.327 
b. Recognizing Rehabilitation in Louisiana 
Louisiana’s practice of mandatory life without parole fails to account
for the possibility of rehabilitation for lifers. The Louisiana Legislature, 
however, has not only recognized the rehabilitation of a certain group of
lifers, but also the unique ability that lifers have to prepare other prisoners
for successful reentry.328 Criminal justice advocates hail the reentry
program at Angola prison as “the gold standard for how to rehabilitate 
criminals and prevent re-offending when prisoners are eventually released
back into society.”329 The legislature created the reentry program in 2010
as an effort to better address successful reintegration into society.330 Since
322. Id. at 101.
323. Id. 
324. Id. at 107.
325. Id. 
326. Id. at 109.
327. See Rebekah Allen, Criminal Justice Advocates Eye Angola’s Re-Entry 
Program as Gold Standard for Prisoner Rehabilitation, ADVOCATE (May 26,
2017, 3:02 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legisla
ture/article_3e1f3d78-424e-11e7-8815-23ee3c5d043a.html [https://perma.cc/XV
54-KYXP].
328. See Reentry Programming, supra note 12.
329. Allen, supra note 327. 
330. Reentry Programming, supra note 12. The long-term goals of the
program are “to improve public safety, reduce recidivism, decrease victimization,
and reduce the financial burden of the correctional system.” Id. 
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1492019] COMMENT
the advent of the reentry program, recidivism rates are down, and the
legislature is looking to expand the program to other prisons.331 
The success of the reentry program is largely attributed to the strength
of the two lifer-led components: vocational training and mentorship.332 
The program consists of 80 lifers who have volunteered to mentor 160
nonviolent offenders in social, moral, and vocational skills that can 
translate into a successful reintegration into society after release.333 
Prisoners at Angola are able to receive an Associate or Bachelor’s Degree
in Theology through partnership with the New Orleans Baptist Seminary 
College, and many serve as missionaries and chaplains skilled in moral
programming.334 Angola also offers a wide array of vocational programs
where prisoners are able to earn construction and mechanic certifications,
such as those required by the National Center for Construction Education
and Research (“NCCER”) and the Automotive Service Excellence
(“ASE”).335 Such certifications can easily qualify an individual for at least
a $20 per hour position, affording the newly released prisoner a much
higher chance at success.336 
The program runs on the “90-10” rule, where participants spend 90%
of their time working on moral rehabilitation and the other 10% on career
development.337 To achieve the 90%, the program pairs each participant
with an inmate serving a life sentence who acts as a mentor.338 Mentors
not only provide career training with mentees during the day but are also
roommates with their mentees to provide constant supervision and
support.339 John Sheehan, an inmate mentor serving a life sentence for
second-degree murder, explained what it means to be mentor: “If we see
something going wrong or see them making a bad choice, we can pull them
aside and say, ‘you need to rethink this.’ We have to live our lives in an
exemplary way for them.”340 Sheehan described how the mentors help the
331. Rick Portier, Angola Inmate Now Productive Auto Mechanic Thanks to
Re-Entry Program, WAFB 9 (May 4, 2017, 8:15 PM), http://www.wafb.com/
story/35346930/angola-inmate-now-productive-auto-mechanic-thanks-to-re-entry-
program/ [https://perma.cc/S765-TT5R]. 
332. See Reentry Programming, supra note 12.
333. Id. The legislature chose Angola to pilot the program because of the
presence of sophisticated career programs and religious groups at the prison. Id.
334. Id.
335. Portier, supra note 331. 
336. Reentry Programming, supra note 12.
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150 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
participants re-evaluate their lives and reach the same “turning point” that
many of the lifers themselves have experienced.341 For many of the 
program mentors, improving public safety through morality and
vocational coaching is a way to give back to society and leave a positive
impact on the outside world that lifers themselves are unlikely to see.342 
The reentry program, though successful, contains numerous
contradictions.343 Lifers—individuals that the legislature has deemed
incapable of rehabilitation—are teaching others how to rehabilitate,
providing moral guidance, and teaching the practical skills that translate
to success on the outside.344 The legislature recognizes the program’s
success, helps to organize the logistics, and has even begun to fund the
program’s expansion; yet, the legislature refuses to acknowledge that the
mentors are the most qualified prisoners for release.345 An expansion of
Act 790 would end the legislature’s contradictory attitude toward lifers
and would also signify a recognition of that which the legislature is clearly
already aware—lifers are not only capable of change but also capable of
instilling the desire to change in others.346 
4. Retribution
Retribution, or the idea that the crime deserves the time, provides
perhaps the strongest argument against expanded parole eligibility to
lifers.347 Inherent in the classical application of retribution is the idea of
proportionality: a punishment should be apportioned in accordance with
the seriousness of the offense.348 Under this theory, many believe that
someone who took a life deserves life in prison.349 Retributive justice,
341. Id.
342. Portier, supra note 331.
343. See generally Reentry Programming, supra note 12.
344. Portier, supra note 331.
345. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 345. At least some
legislators have recognized that mentors within the reentry program are deserving
of parole eligibility. In the 2019 Regular Legislative Session, Representative C.
Denise Marcelle introduced House Bill 37, which would have provided parole 
eligibility to individuals serving as mentors within the reentry program. See H.B.
37, 2019 Reg. Sess. (La. 2019). The House of Representatives, however, voted
against the bill—68 to 23. House Vote on HB 37 Final Passage, H.B. 37, 2019
Reg. Sess., (La. 2019), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument
.aspx?d=1135806 [https://perma.cc/7A8F-W8AA]. 
346. Callaghan, supra note 20.
347. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 345–46.
348. Id. at 345.
349. Id.
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1512019] COMMENT
however, does not support the continued incarceration of rehabilitated
prisoners for two primary reasons.350 First, the tough-on-crime era gave
rise to disproportionate sentencing in Louisiana, where relatively minor
crimes resulted in severe sentences.351 Many prisoners in Louisiana
currently serve life sentences for disproportionately minor crimes, and
Louisiana’s failure to expand parole eligibility to those lifers only
highlights the unjustness of their sentences.352 Second, under the classical
application of retribution, the punitive effect should be limited by other
justifications of incarceration and should not exceed the length of time
necessary to achieve the desired effects of incapacitation and deterrence.353 
Louisiana legislators shot down past attempts to modify Act 790 because
they believed that giving lifers parole would violate the victim’s right to
retribution.354 The legislature, however, must reprioritize the role of
retribution with the public safety-driven goals of incapacitation and
deterrence if the state wants true reform.355 
a. Measuring Proportionality in Louisiana 
Even under the strictest application of proportionality, Louisiana’s
current sentencing structure clearly is, in many respects,
disproportionate.356 Under Louisiana’s habitual offender law, individuals 
frequently serve life-without-parole sentences for what many consider
low-level crimes.357 For example, the state sentenced Ricky Carthan to life
without parole under Louisiana’s habitual offender law for his most recent
offense of possession of stolen junk metal.358 Additionally, Kerry Orgeron 
is serving life without parole for his most recent offense of purse
snatching.359 Where Kerry and Ricky’s relatively smaller offenses
350. Id.
351. Id.; Pelot-Hobbs, supra note 116.
352. See Turkington, supra note 35; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 
33, at 342.
353. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 342.
354. See Hearing on S.B. 269, supra note 211. 
355. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 342.
356. Turkington, supra note 35.
357. Id. Under Louisiana’s habitual offender statute, individuals sentenced to
a second or third felony conviction or a fourth or subsequent nonviolent offense
were sentenced to life without parole. Id.
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152 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
ordinarily would have cost them a few years in prison, the habitual
offender law ensured that their offenses cost them their lives.360 
An ACLU investigation into Louisiana’s judicial sentencing records
made the effects of the habitual offender law clear.361 The ACLU
discovered that in most cases where the state sentenced an individual to
life without parole under the habitual offender law, the judge would have
imposed a sentence of less than 10 years if he did not have to comply with
the mandatory minimum.362 A life-without-parole sentence for offenses
like Kerry’s and Ricky’s is clearly disproportionate—the seriousness of
the punishment is not scaled to the seriousness of the offense.363 Even 
under the most severe ideals of exact retribution and proportionality, the
justification for the sentence is simply unsubstantiated.364 
In the 2017 JRI legislation, Louisiana legislators acknowledged the 
severe and excessive sentences given under the habitual offender statute, 
as well as the law’s contribution to Louisiana’s mass incarceration.365 
Senate Bill 221 of the JRI legislation lowered mandatory minimums,
reduced the “cleansing period” between offenses, and removed the 
possibility of a life sentence for a fourth nonviolent offense.366 The
amendment only applied prospectively, however, and failed to address the 
approximately 650 inmates convicted under the habitual offender statute
who are currently serving life sentences in Louisiana.367 Senate Bill 221 
marks the legislature’s recognition of the injustice exacted under the
habitual offender statute; yet, because the bill did not apply retroactively, 
it left much of the problem unsolved.368 The proposed amendment to Act
360. Id. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. In Louisiana, it is possible to see what sentence the judge would have
chosen had he not been required to comply with a mandatory minimum. Id. 
363. See Pelot-Hobbs, supra note 116; A Living Death, supra note 358. 
364. See Turkington, supra note 35.
365. JRI PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra note 85, at 18–19.
366. Id.; TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 48.
The cleansing period refers to the time between crimes after which a previous
offense will not count as an additional offense toward the habitual offender
statute. JRI PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra note 85, at 18.
367. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 56.
368. See id. at 56–59. As a product of the 2019 Regular Legislative Session,
Governor Edwards signed into law House Bill 518, which further softed
Louisiana’s habitual offender law by removing certain first-time offenses from
eligibility for sentence enhancement. See LPA: Louisiana Takes Modest First Step
in Reforming Ineffective Habitual Offender Statute, ACLU LA. (June 5, 2019), 
https://www.laaclu.org/en/press-releases/lpa-louisiana-takes-modest-first-step-re
forming-ineffective-habitual-offender-statute [https://perma.cc/9H9N-GHHJ].
337366-LSU_80-1_Text.indd  159 11/27/19  9:28 AM








   
    
 
   
    
 
  
   
  




     
 
 
   
  
      
   
   
  




    
       
  
      
   
   
     
   
       
   
        
1532019] COMMENT
790 would allow the legislature to ameliorate the injustice of sentences
exacted under the habitual offender statute and still avoid the
administrative cost of re-sentencing all affected individuals.369 
b. Balancing the Victim’s Right to Retribution
Retribution represents the societal opinion as to what a criminal
deserves and is therefore not as “finely tuned” as the other purposes of
incarceration—deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—which “are
more utilitarian [and] intended to promote public safety.”370 To truly
correct the injustices of mass incarceration, Louisiana must reprioritize the
goal of retribution alongside the other, more empirically sound objectives
of incarceration.371 Still, the Louisiana Legislature must also balance the
victim’s interests when retroactively mitigating existing sentences, for 
retribution is not only linked to conceptions of what the criminal deserves,
but to what the victim, the victim’s family, and the community deserve as
well.372 
During the Senate Judiciary Committee’s deliberation on whether to
expand Act 790 under Senate Bill 269, the legislators debated at length
about what victims and their families deserved.373 Through the execution
of a life sentence, the judicial system promised victims that their assailants 
would never again be released into the community, and the LDAA argued 
that the legislature needed to keep those promises.374 Ideals of
deservedness, however, are inherently linked to the existing sentencing
structure.375 Victims are only led to believe that their assailants will never
be released from prison because the mandatory minimum for that crime
creates the expectation that life without parole is the “deserved”
sentence.376 
In Texas, for example, an individual becomes parole eligible after
serving 30 years of a life sentence.377 Therefore, family members of
Like Senate Bill 221, House Bill 518 does not address individuals sentenced under
the previous law. See H.B. 518, La. Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
369. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
23, at 56–59.
370. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 326.
371. Id. at 347.
372. Id. at 22.
373. Hearing on S.B. 269, supra note 211.
374. Id.
375. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 342–45.
376. Id.
377. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 56.
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154 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
second-degree murder victims in Texas have the expectation that the
defendant has the potential for release after 30 years.378 The family 
members of second-degree murder victims in Texas deserve the
consolation of exacted retribution no less than family members in
Louisiana, but the Texas Legislature has more appropriately balanced the
victims’ right to retribution alongside incarceration’s other penological
goals.379 If the Louisiana Legislature gives an individual a more severe
punishment than the individual deserved—an unjust sentence by
definition—the victim’s expectations and, understandably, emotionally
charged desire to see the individual locked away should not be what stops
the state’s attempt to remedy or mitigate the prior injustice.380 It is clear
that the voices of victims and prosecutors play a vital role in ensuring the
proper carriage of justice.381 The Louisiana Legislature must appreciate, 
however, that the victims’ and prosecutors’ opinions should not be the sole
consideration as to whether an individual experiences freedom.382 
The proposed amendment to Act 790 does not aim to exclude victims
or prosecutors from the parole process. Rather, both parties would
continue to have an influential role in parole determinations.383 For any 
given parole hearing, the DOC notifies the victim or victim’s family and
the district attorney when the offender’s parole hearing draws near, and
both the victim and the district attorney have the opportunity to submit
opposition and to speak at the hearing if they so desire.384 A national
survey revealed that parole boards across the country rank victim input
and opposition at parole hearings as the most significant influence on the
parole decision—even over the input of judges and prosecutors—clearly
demonstrating the significant role that victims play in the parole 
process.385 Victims also have considerable influence over where the 
prisoner is released on parole and may request that he not be released
within a certain proximity of the victim or the victim’s family.386 Because
the legislature allows victims the opportunity to play a role in the parole
378. Id. 
379. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 342–45.
380. See id. at 346. 
381. See id. at 326.
382. See id. 
383. See, e.g., JRI PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 79, at 10–11.
384. Id. at 15. Part of the initial JRI legislation included the right of crime
victims to submit a “reentry statement,” which it codified within Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 46:1844. JRI PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra note 85, at 33.
385. Catherine C. McVey et al., Modernizing Parole Statutes: Guidance from
Evidence-Based Practice, ROBINA INST. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 8 (2018).
386. JRI PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra note 85, at 33.
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1552019] COMMENT
hearing, the victims’ voices and concerns are not diminished, but they also 
do not carry so much weight as to overemphasize the role of retribution in
the sentencing of the defendant.387 
C. Time’s Up: Political Shifts Pave the Way for the Expansion of Act 790
The purposes for incarceration—incapacitation, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution—are not properly served when the law
mandates a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.388 
Additionally, the continued incarceration of rehabilitated prisoners is an
inefficient allocation of the state’s limited resources.389 With this
knowledge, the legislature has two options: continue to prioritize purely
punitive policies over public safety, or expand parole eligibility under Act
790.390 Recent events have made clear that the American public and the 
Louisiana electorate will no longer embrace the willful ignorance that
enables the survival of ineffective and inefficient sentencing practices.391 
For instance, the recent Supreme Court decisions, Graham v. Florida and
Miller v. Alabama, demonstrate that societal views defining morally
acceptable sentences are changing and that life without parole currently
hangs on the cusp of acceptability.392 Another such event is the Louisiana
electorate’s vote acknowledging the state’s non-unanimous jury system as
producing racially disparate and unjust sentences.393 Both the Supreme
Court decisions and Louisiana’s vote to end non-unanimous juries signify 
a societal shift in favor of ending strictly punitive practices that do nothing
to further public safety.394 The current political climate thus marks the 
opportune moment for the Louisiana Legislature to adopt the proposed
amendment to Act 790 and expand parole eligibility to lifers in
Louisiana.395 
387. McVey et al., supra note 385. 
388. See PFAFF, supra note 21, at 191.
389. See generally supra Sections III.A–B.
390. See generally supra Sections III.A–B.
391. See infra Sections III.C.1–3. 
392. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460 (2012).
393. John Simerman & Gordon Russel, Louisiana Voters Scrap Jim Crow-Era




394. See generally id.
395. See discussion infra Sections III.C.1.a–b.
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156 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
1. The “Evolving” Standard of Life Without Parole and Why 
Louisiana Should Evolve with It
Until recently, the United States Supreme Court has held that there
exists a stark difference between the levels of Eighth Amendment scrutiny 
for capital and non-capital cases.396 The Supreme Court evaluates death
penalty cases, unlike non-capital cases, under the “evolving standard of
decency.”397 Using this analysis, the Court looks to “objective indicia to
determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing
practice at issue;” whether the sentence imposed is disproportionate to the
crime; and whether the opposed practice performs a legitimate penological
goal.398 In other words, under the evolving standard of decency, the 
Supreme Court uses “contemporary societal norms” to create the scale
against which the proportionality and utility of the sentence is measured.399 
The Supreme Court has long held that “death is different” and that any
degree of proportionality review afforded to death penalty cases does not
apply to non-capital cases.400 Under the previous standard, therefore,
courts would have never deemed sentences to life without parole excessive 
or unconstitutional.401 Graham and Miller, however, raised the question of
whether greater scrutiny for non-capital cases is on the horizon.402 If so, 
Louisiana’s refusal to expand parole eligibility to lifers is of questionable
constitutionality.
396. SeeU.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
397. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957.
398. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
399. See Berry, supra note 312, at 1111. “This is because ‘the standard of
extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral 
judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change
as the basic mores of society change.’” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419
(2008) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
400. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 958. Prior to the Graham and Miller decisions, the
Supreme Court emphasized that there is no proportionality review for non-capital
cases because the Eighth Amendment acts only as a remote check on state 
legislatures’ use of the limited category of punishments that are cruel and unusual
regardless of context. See id.
401. See id. (holding that a sentence of mandatory life without parole for
possessing 650 grams of cocaine, without considering mitigating factors, “may be
cruel, but [is] not unusual in the constitutional sense.”).
402. Berry, supra note 312, at 1115.
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1572019] COMMENT
a. Death is Different No Longer: The Importance of Graham and 
Miller
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Graham v. Florida hinted that a
higher standard against which to measure life-without-parole sentences
might be forthcoming.403 In 2010, the Supreme Court held in Graham that 
states cannot sentence juvenile offenders to life without parole for non-
homicide offenses under the Eighth Amendment.404 In reaching its 
decision, the Supreme Court applied the “evolving standards of decency” 
test for the first time in a non-capital case, greatly expanding the scope of
Eighth Amendment review.405 In Justice Thomas’s dissent in Graham, he
stated, “Today’s decision eviscerates [the] distinction [between capital and
non-capital cases]. ‘Death is different’ no longer.”406 
The Supreme Court later affirmed and expanded its holding in
Graham with its decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v.
Louisiana, holding unconstitutional the mandatory sentences of life 
without parole for all juveniles, including those convicted of homicide.407 
The Supreme Court has not since encountered a case questioning the
constitutionality of an adult sentenced to life without parole.408 Until then, 
the public is left to hypothesize whether the Supreme Court will employ
an Eighth Amendment review for life without parole in the near future and
how Louisiana’s current sentencing structure measures under the
“evolving standards of decency.”409 
b. Objective Indicia of Consensus Against Mandatory Life Without
Parole
Louisiana’s exclusion of lifers from parole eligibility would likely
qualify as an unconstitutional practice under the Supreme Court’s standard
403. Id. at 1122.
404. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The Graham Court found that the
diminished moral culpability of youth entitled non-homicide juvenile offenders to
“a meaningful opportunity for release” based upon demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation. Id. at 75.
405. Berry, supra note 312, at 1122.
406. Graham, 560 U.S. at 103 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Berry, supra note 312, 
at 1112.
407. SeeMiller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that mandatory life
without parole is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders); Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (holding that the Miller decision was to be 
applied retroactively).
408. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718.
409. Berry, supra note 312, at 1111.
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158 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
for Eighth Amendment scrutiny.410 The first step in an Eighth Amendment
review involves a survey of the current objective indicia of national
consensus—or evidence suggesting society’s general view as to the
sentencing practice at issue.411 According the Supreme Court in Atkins v.
Virginia, “the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures.”412 Only six states, including Louisiana, do not separate life
from life without parole and have mandatory life sentences that implicitly 
bar parole eligibility.413 Of these six states, Louisiana is one of two states
where second-degree murder carries a mandatory minimum of a life
sentence.414 The majority of the country has thus clearly reached a 
consensus as to the indecency of prohibiting parole eligibility for all lifers,
and Louisiana is in the minority.415 
Further, a look to the use of life without parole in other countries 
reveals that America’s industrialized counterparts have clearly evolved
away from the use of excessive sentences.416 Although not dispositive in
an Eighth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has looked to
international opinions surrounding certain punishments to help inform its 
determination of what is cruel and unusual.417 Many democratic countries,
including Germany, France, and Italy, have abolished life without parole
as unconstitutional.418 Other countries that maintain life without parole use
it in exceedingly rare situations, such as the United Kingdom, in which
only 49 people are serving life without parole.419 Thus, a look to the laws 
of industrialized nations demonstrates that many countries are mitigating
the use of harsh punishments.420 Under the objective indicia of consensus,
it is therefore clear that Louisiana’s practice of life without parole is falling
behind societal norms.421 Louisiana’s use of the sentence will thus be
410. See generally id.
411. See id. 
412. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
413. LIEM, supra note 106, at 6.
414. TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 56.
415. See id.
416. See Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 151.
417. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80 (2010).
418. Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 151.
419. Mauer, supra note 25, at 2. Further, individuals serving parole-eligible
life sentences in the United Kingdom typically spend less than 15 years in prison.
Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 151.
420. SeeMauer, supra note 25, at 2.
421. See generally Graham, 560 U.S. at 80.
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1592019] COMMENT
considered cruel and unusual if it can also be proven that the sentence 
given is disproportionately severe in relation to the underlying crime and
that the sentence serves no greater societal purpose.422 
c. The Skewed Proportionality and Failed Utility of Parole 
Ineligibility for Lifers 
Under an Eighth Amendment Review, the Supreme Court would
likely find Louisiana’s use of life without parole as cruel and unusual
because the sentence is often inordinately more severe than the underlying
crime and does little to further public safety.423 The second step in the 
Eighth Amendment analysis considers the “culpability of the offenders at
issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of
the punishment . . . and whether the challenged sentence serves legitimate
penological goals.”424 Denying parole eligibility to older lifers
unmistakably fails to serve the purpose of each penological goal of
incarceration.425 Additionally, provided the many nonviolent offenders
serving life without parole under Louisiana’s habitual offender statute, 
Louisiana’s current sentencing structure mandates the imposition of
disproportionate and excessive sentences.426 
The current version of Act 790 would likely be unconstitutional under
the Eighth Amendment because older lifers have the lowest recidivism
rates, are capable of rehabilitation, and are overly punished according to
societal standards.427 The question then becomes whether the Louisiana
Legislature will wait for the Supreme Court to act, like it did with the
Miller and Montgomery decisions, or whether the 2017 JRI legislation
truly marked a turning point for Louisiana as a more proactive state.428 If
it is indeed the latter, then an expansion of Act 790 is the next appropriate
step.429 Based upon the November 2018 vote to end non-unanimous juries
in Louisiana, the citizens of the state are clearly ready to leave Louisiana’s
antiquated practices behind.430 It is time that the legislature did too.
422. See id.
423. See id.
424. See id. at 67.
425. See supra Section III.B. 
426. See discussion supra Section III.B.4.a.
427. See generally Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.
428. See generally Berry, supra note 312. 
429. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460.
430. Simerman & Russel, supra note 393; Jenny Jarvie, In Louisiana, a Fight
to End a Jim Crow-Era Jury Law is on the Ballot, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018,
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160 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
2. Amending Act 790 Can Ameliorate Harm from Louisiana’s
Non-Unanimous Jury Verdict Law
Before November of 2018, Louisiana was the only state to allow a
conviction after a non-unanimous jury verdict in a murder trial and one of
two states to allow a hung jury conviction in felony trials.431 The law
originally set out to “establish the supremacy of the white race in this State
to the extent to which it could be legally and constitutionally done.”432 As
Louisiana defendants are disproportionately black, and jurors are 
disproportionately white, the law is clearly effectuating its original, 
discriminatory purpose.433 In November of 2018, Louisianans voted to 
amend the Louisiana Constitution to mandate unanimous jury verdicts;
however, the amendment is not retroactive and will not address the
erroneous convictions and excessive sentences already imposed.434 
Expanding parole eligibility to lifers will further the goal of the recent
constitutional amendment and mitigate some of the harm that the racist
law previously exacted.435 
The impact of the non-unanimous jury verdict law is staggering.436 In 
a study that assessed jury voting records for 993 convictions over the
course of six years, the unanimous jury verdict law would have invalidated
402.437 The law has also had a profound impact on lifers.438 In early 2018, 
Louisiana had 4,828 people serving life without parole—five times as
many inmates serving life without parole as Texas, even though Texas has
six times as many people.439 Another 1,224 Louisiana prisoners are serving
virtual life sentences of 50 years or more.440 In Louisiana, juries convicted
3:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-louisiana-jury-20180912-story
.html [https://perma.cc/4ZV3-RWYB].
431. Jarvie, supra note 430.
432. Swenson, supra note 35. The quotation is an excerpt from The Official
Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of 
Louisiana, which recorded the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1898. Id. 
433. Id.
434. Simerman & Russel, supra note 393. Article 17 of the Louisiana
Constitution now mandates that, in all cases where the penalty is hard labor, a
unanimous jury is necessary to obtain a conviction if the offense was committed
after January 1, 2019, but a non-unanimous jury may still convict an individual
whose offense was committed prior to January 1, 2019. La. Const. Ann. art. I, § 17.
435. See TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 56.
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1612019] COMMENT
most of the 6,052 prisoners serving life or virtual life, one-third of which
were non-unanimous verdicts.441 Hence, non-unanimous juries have
convicted an estimated 2,000 people currently serving life or virtual life.442 
Those are 2,000 sentences that the citizens of Louisiana have decided are
unjust and excessive.443 An expansion to Act 790 is therefore necessary to
ameliorate the injustice that Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury law exacted
and to extend the recent amendment to the many lifers to whom Louisiana
failed to deliver justice.444 
3. The Support for the Proposed Amendment to Act 790 Has Arrived
The 2017 JRI legislation signified the Louisiana Legislature’s
commitment to ending criminal justice practices that propelled mass
incarceration and did nothing to further public safety.445 Unfortunately,
fear of an unsupportive constituency kept many politicians from
advocating for more impactful changes, like reforming sentences for
violent crime.446 Recent events, however, demonstrate higher constituent
support for such reforms than politicians originally believed.447 The Eighth 
Amendment analysis demonstrates changing societal norms, and public
favor for costly and purely punitive policies grows weak.448 Additionally,
the action of Louisiana citizens to affirmatively vote for unanimous juries
indicates that when Louisiana citizens are made aware of the failed utility
of an existing practice, they will vote in favor of efficiency and justice.449 
The time has come for the legislature to act in accordance with the will of
its citizens, to fulfill the initial promises of JRI, and to bring an end to the
unjust, inefficient practice of continued incarceration of rehabilitated
offenders.450 The Louisiana Legislature should thus amend Louisiana 
Revised Statutes § 15:574.4(A)(2) to read as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, any
person serving a life sentence, with or without the benefit of parole,
shall be eligible for parole consideration upon serving at least 20
441. See id.
442. See id.
443. See generally id.
444. See generally id.
445. See TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 23.
446. See id. at 56; Johnson, supra note 142.
447. See generally supra Sections III.C.1–2. 
448. See supra Sections III.C.1.a–b.
449. See supra Section III.C.2. 
450. See generally Simerman & Russel, supra note 393.
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162 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
years of the term or terms of the imprisonment, and upon reaching
the age of 50. This amendment shall apply retroactively.451 
The proposed amendment to Act 790 offers the Louisiana Legislature
the opportunity to make a financially expedient decision that also increases
public safety and promotes the administration of just sentences in
Louisiana.452 Instead of spending millions of dollars to incarcerate 
rehabilitated offenders, the legislature can allocate those funds into public
safety measures that are proven to work.453 The expansion of Act 790 will
also realize justice for the thousands of prisoners in Louisiana currently
serving excessive sentences.454 Finally, the legislature’s adoption of the
proposed amendment will signify that, like the citizens of Louisiana, the 
legislature is also ready to leave the state’s dark past behind.455 
CONCLUSION
Louisiana’s overuse of excessive sentences is intricately tied to its
history of mass incarceration.456 A sentence is excessive if it causes the 
incarceration of an individual beyond what is necessary to achieve desired
penological goals.457 Mandatory life without parole incapacitates beyond
efficiency, fails to deter future criminals, and disproportionately exacts
retribution, making the continued incarceration of rehabilitated individuals
451. The current version of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:574.4(A)(2)
reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (1) of this Subsection or
any other law to the contrary, unless eligible for parole at an earlier date,
a person committed to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections
for a term or terms of imprisonment with or without benefit of parole for
thirty years or more shall be eligible for parole consideration upon
serving at least twenty years of the term or terms of imprisonment in
actual custody and upon reaching the age of forty-five. This provision
shall not apply to a person serving a life sentence unless the sentence has 
been commuted to a fixed term of years.
LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(A)(2) (2018).
452. See generally Mauer, supra note 25, at 2; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 33, at 326; PFAFF, supra note 21, at 191.
453. See generally Mauer, supra note 25, at 2; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 33, at 326; PFAFF, supra note 21, at 191.
454. See TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 16.
455. See generally Simerman & Russel, supra note 393.
456. Mauer, supra note 25, at 2.
457. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 326.
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1632019] COMMENT
excessive and unjust.458 As the Louisiana Legislature has finally made a 
commitment to correcting the failures within the state’s justice system, the
time has come to recognize the ineffectiveness of mandating parole
ineligibility for lifers.459 Louisiana has an opportunity to move beyond
modest reform efforts and toward real change that will have profound
impacts for the state.460 Adopting the proposed amendment to Louisiana 
Revised Statutes § 15:574.4(A)(2) will signify that the Louisiana 
Legislature is truly committed to severing ties with past practices of mass
incarceration and reaffirm its commitment to a criminal justice system that
strives for societal benefit rather than maintaining the status quo.461 
458. See id.
459. See id. at 23.
460. See Ghandnoosh, supra note 25, at 148.
461. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
23, at 57; PFAFF, supra note 21, at 14–15.
